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During 1776, but prior to announcing the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress instructed the state legislatures to call conventions to 
draft constitutions to regularize their local state governments so that each could 
be administered in the name of the people and absent royal governors and royal 
officers.1 North Carolina heeded the revolutionary call—in 1776, it implemented a 
new constitution with a bill of rights.2 One interesting feature of the 1776 North 
Carolina Constitution was that Article 32 imposed a religious test. Article 32 stated: 
That no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine 
authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible 
with the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or 
profit in the civil department within this State.3
Article 32’s religious test extended to four categories of persons, including: 
atheists, that is, those “who . . . deny the being of God”; non-Protestants, that is, those 
“who . . . deny . . . the truth of the Protestant religion”; non-Christians, that is, those 
1. Erwin C. Surrency, “The Transition from Colonialism to Independence,” American Journal of Legal History 
46 (January 2004): 55, 57–58. See, for example, Journals of the Continental Congress 1774–1789: 1776 January 
1–June 4, multiple vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 4:357–358 (May 15, 1776) 
and 4:341–342 (May 10, 1776).
2. “Th[e] [1776 state] constitution was framed by a ‘Congress,’ ‘elected and chosen for that particular purpose,’ 
which assembled at Halifax[,] November 12, 1776, and completed its labors December 18, 1776. It was not 
submitted to the people for ratification.” Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, 7 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 5:2787.
3. Ibid., 5:2793. 
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“who . . . deny . . . the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments”; and 
an amorphous category of persons “who . . . hold religious principles incompatible 
with the freedom and safety of the State.” A person falling in any of these four 
categories was not “capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the 
civil department within this State.” What the scope of this language is has been a 
matter of debate. 
This particular provision would remain on the books, largely unenforced,4 until 
North Carolina revisited the issue during the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional 
Convention, which drafted proposed amendments, subsequently ratified by the 
people, to the 1776 North Carolina Constitution.5 Still, in 1809, there was one 
(apparent) attempt to enforce the religious test provision.6 In 1809, Jacob Henry7 was 
4. Even if not enforced, Article 32 likely deterred some persons from seeking state positions. And given 
the provision’s lack of clarity as to which persons and what positions were covered, candidates might have 
refrained from seeking posts for which they were, arguably, legally eligible. Second, it is not entirely clear what 
efforts—other than the Henry motion—were taken to enforce Article 32. Milton Ready has described it as 
“[s]eldom enforced.” Ready, The Tar Heel State: A History of North Carolina (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2005), 170. But see William S. Powell, North Carolina through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 273 (asserting that the Henry motion was the only attempt to 
enforce Article 32). 
5. In consequence of amendments to the 1776 North Carolina Constitution proposed by the 1835 North 
Carolina Constitutional Convention, the religious test was amended: it permitted Protestant as well as 
non-Protestant Christians—that is, all Christians—to hold office. Jews, adherents of other non-Christian 
religions, as well as atheists and agnostics were still left in a political wilderness of sorts. Ronnie W. Faulkner, 
“Constitution of 1835,” North Carolina History Project, https://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/
constitution-of-1835/. But see David Sorkin, “Is American Jewry Exceptional? Comparing Jewish Emancipation 
in Europe and America,” American Jewish History 96 (September 2010): 175, 191 (“The North Carolina 
constitution permitted only Protestants to hold office until 1868.”). The proscription against Jews and at 
least some adherents of other non-Christian religions was abandoned by the 1868 state constitution. North 
Carolina Const. of 1868, art. 6, section 5 (mandating disqualification for office as extending to “All persons 
who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”). This religious test remains in the North Carolina Constitution 
of 1971, now in force. See art. 6, section 8. On its face, this proscription still extends to atheists, agnostics, and, 
perhaps, others. Nevertheless, the provision is likely inoperative in consequence of the incorporation of the 
First Amendment against the States and settled U.S. Supreme Court case law. Torcaso v. Watkins, United States 
Reports, 367 (Supreme Court of the United States 1961) 488 (Black, J [Justice]). But see Eric Eisner, “ ‘Suffer 
Not the Evil One’: Unitarianism and the 1826 Maryland Jew Bill,” Journal of Religious History 44 (September 
2020): 338, 354 n. 77 (asserting the “formal abolition” of North Carolina’s religious test).
6. John H. Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, from 1584 to 1851, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 
Grambo and Co., 1851), 2:74 (stating that the Jacob Henry incident was “the first time in the history of the 
State that this question had been made”); see also James S. Kabala, Church-State Relations in the Early American 
Republic, 1787–1846 (Abingdon, Engl.: Routledge, 2016), 110. See note 4, above. 
7. Jacob Henry was one of two House members for Carteret County. Journal of the House of Commons of 
the State of North Carolina, multiple vols. (Raleigh, N.C.: Gales and Seaton, n.d.), 1 (November 20, 1809). 
Henry’s home was in Beaufort, the county seat. “Marriage and Death Notices from the City Gazette of 
Charleston, S.C.,” South Carolina Historical Magazine 53 (July 1952): 172, 174. On thin evidence, Leon 
Hühner suggested that Jacob Henry was an American Patriot and prisoner of the British during the War of 
Independence. Leon Hühner, “The Jews of South Carolina from the Earliest Settlement to the End of the 
American Revolution,” Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society 12 (1904): 39, 55–56. However, it 
seems uncontroversial that Henry was born between 1774 and 1775. Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, 
s.v. “Henry, Jacob”; Ira Rosenwaike, “Further Light on Jacob Henry,” American Jewish Archives 22 (November 
1970): 116, 120. Thus, Hühner’s claim as to Henry’s purported War of Independence service seems very 
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elected and qualified for a second annual term8 in North Carolina’s lower legislative 
house, the House of Commons, as one of two members for Carteret County. Henry 
was Jewish.9 The House convened on November 20, 1809, and on December 5, 
1809, another member, Hugh C. Mills, put forward a motion to declare Henry’s seat 
vacant based on the 1776 North Carolina Constitution’s religious test. The next day, 
the Commons adjudicated the motion, and the motion failed. Henry kept his seat.10
The modern postbellum tertiary literature relating to the 1809 motion to vacate 
Henry’s seat is based largely on an antebellum literature, i.e., secondary sources from the 
mistaken. There is, however, good reason to believe that Henry was a captain in the state militia during the 
War of 1812. Leonard Rogoff, Down Home: Jewish Life in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), 43. Still, it is possible, and indeed likely, that there was more than one “Jacob Henry” 
in North Carolina in the early 1800s. 
8. Jacob Henry had also been elected to the 1808 annual legislative term. Morton Borden, Jews, Turks, and 
Infidels (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 43 (“[Henry] served in the 1808 session 
without objection, possibly because no one noticed that he did not take the oath, or because no one recalled 
the constitutional prohibition.”). Borden puts forward no reason to suspect that Henry failed to take the 
oath at the start of the 1808 legislative term. See also Frederic Cople Jaher, The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, 
Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 143; Jacob Rader Marcus, United States Jewry, 1776–1985, multiple vols. (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1989), 1:506, 507; Oscar Reiss, The Jews in Colonial America (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland and Co., 2004), 117. 
9. That is, according to the standard narrative, Henry was Jewish. The scope, extent, or definition of Henry’s 
Judaism and what Henry’s being a Jew meant to him, to his family and household, to his neighbors and 
contemporaries, to his colleagues in the Commons, to his Carteret County constituents, to the wider state 
and national political community, and to modern readers are all questions well beyond the scope of this 
article. As explained below, several of Henry’s colleagues in the Commons had no clear idea whether Henry 
was Jewish. See notes 133 to 135, and accompanying text, below. Likewise, the legal system (in the form of the 
North Carolina House of Commons and its committee of the whole) never held any substantial debate on 
such abstractions. More to the point, the words “Jewish,” “Judaism,” and “Jew” nowhere appear in Henry’s 
speech in his own defense. Compare Leonard Rogoff, Homelands: Southern Jewish Identity in Durham and Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 10 (“Henry never mentioned Judaism 
by name. . . .”), with Eli N. Evans, The Provincials: A Personal History of Jews in the South (New York: Atheneum, 
1973), 363 (characterizing Henry’s speech as “one of the first statements on Jewish rights in America”), and 
Eli Faber, “America’s Earliest Jewish Settlers, 1654–1820,” in Marc Lee Raphael, ed., The Columbia History 
of Jews and Judaism in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 21, 40. Likewise, the words 
“Jewish,” “Judaism,” and “Jew” do not appear in Mills’s motion to declare Henry’s seat vacant. 
10. Journal of the House of Commons, 26–27 (December 5, 1809); ibid., 28 (December 6, 1809). One modern 
commentator has suggested that Henry did not prevail. See Justice Barbara A. Jackson, “Called to Duty: 
Justice William J. Gaston,” North Carolina Law Review 94 (September 2016): 2051, 2058. Wheeler and 
more recent commentators have made the very same mistake. Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 
2:74; see also Alan Dershowitz, Blasphemy: How the Religious Right is Hijacking our Declaration of Independence 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 78. Another commentator wrote that Henry was elected in 
1810, not 1809. Leon Hühner, “The Jews of North Carolina Prior to 1800,” Publications of the American Jewish 
Historical Society 29 (1925): 137, 140; see also E. H. Lindo, A Jewish Calendar for Sixty-Four Years (London: 
L. Thompson, 1838), 132. More than one commentator has suggested the events at issue happened in 1808. 
See Ready, The Tar Heel State, 173; and Allen J. Going, review of Jews in the South, by Leonard Dinnerstein 
and Mary Dale Palsson, eds., Historian 36 (May 1974): 563. The source of this error may have been Justice 
Gaston’s speech from the 1835 state constitutional convention. See note 48, and accompanying text, below. 
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mid-1810s into the 1850s, and primary documents from that period.11 Some of those early 
sources were part of the public debate surrounding reform of the 1776 North Carolina 
Constitution’s religious test, including debates on proposed amendments to reform 
or abolish Article 32, heard in the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention. 
Some of those sources carry good indicia of authenticity and reliability, as some of the 
1835 participants had been part of the earlier 1809 drama. On the other hand, there is 
some reason to doubt the reliability of these sources as guides for understanding either 
the events of 1809 or the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, as these later sources 
were created during ongoing debates over political reform. Furthermore, these were 
not contemporaneous records; by 1835, when the state constitutional convention met, 
memories of 1809 and 1776 might well have grown dim.12 
11. Perhaps the best example of this modern postbellum tertiary literature is Leon Hühner, “The Struggle for 
Religious Liberty in North Carolina, with Special Reference to the Jews,” Publications of the American Jewish 
Historical Society 16 (1907): 37, 46–54, 68–71.
12. Certainly, Justice Gaston, speaking in 1835, at the state constitutional convention, erred when reporting 
that that the Henry proceedings happened in 1808, rather than in 1809. See note 48, and accompanying 
text, below.
Jacob Henry’s house, built around 1794, is located on Front Street in Beaufort, North Carolina in Carteret County. 
It was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1973. Photograph, dated March 1972, from the State 
Archives of North Carolina, Raleigh.
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This article will summarize the standard narrative handed down from the 1830s, 
to illustrate how that narrative has been misunderstood (at least in part) by historians 
and other academics in more modern times, along with problems in that narrative. 
It will also examine primary sources from December 1809 and early 1810. These 
records are not discussed in the largest part of the extant Jacob Henry literature, 
and they offer a significantly different account of what happened on the floor of the 
Commons on December 5 and 6, 1809. The article will then offer some personal 
reflections on the difficulties surrounding legal history, particularly where (as here) 
the underlying historical issues touch on deeply held moral and political intuitions 
about the good society and our common historical past. 

On November 20, 1809, the North Carolina House of Commons convened. The 
returning officers reported which persons had been elected, and the members-elect, 
without reported objections, took their oaths.13 On December 5, 1809, a new train 
of events was put in motion by Hugh C. Mills—one of two members of the House 
of Commons for Rockingham County.14 On that date, the House of Commons’ 
Journal reported: 
Mr. Mills moved that the house do enter into the following resolution:
WHERE AS it is contrary to the freedom and independence of our happy and beloved government, 
that any person should be allowed to have a seat in this Assembly, or to watch over the rights of a 
free people, who is not constitutionally qualified for that purpose; it is therefore made known, that a 
certain Jacob Henry, a member of this house, denies the divine authority of the New Testament, and 
refused to take the oath prescribed by law for his qualification, in violation of the Constitution of this 
State. Resolved. That the said Jacob Henry is not entitled to a seat in this house, and that the same be 
vacated. The resolution being read, the house resolved that the consideration thereof be postponed 
until to-morrow.15 
Mills’s “denies the divine authority of the New Testament”-language closely 
tracks the text of Article 32’s religious test. Mills’s assertion that Henry “refused to 
take the oath prescribed by law for his qualification” is considerably more opaque. 
13. Journal of the House of Commons, 1–2 (November 20, 1809). 
14. Hugh C. Mills was one of two House members for Rockingham County. Journal of the House of Commons, 
1 (November 20, 1809). This was Mills’s first and only term. Perhaps Mills’s intervention against Jacob Henry 
was not welcomed by his constituents. The Legislative Manual and Political Register of the State of North Carolina, 
for the Year 1874 (Raleigh, N.C.: Josiah Turner Jr., 1874), 327; “Mills, Hugh,” A New Nation Votes: American 
Election Returns, 1787–1825, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/MH0078. In 1824, a newspaper 
reported the “murder, most foul” of a “Hugh C. Mills” in St. Francisville, Louisiana. New Orleans Le Courrier 
de la Louisiane, February 6, 1824. Is this the same Hugh C. Mills?
15. Journal of the House of Commons, 27 (December 5, 1809). 
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It is not clear if Mills was asserting that Henry had refused to take an oath which 
had been imposed by the 1776 state constitution,16 or that Henry had refused to 
take an oath which had been established by statute or by the House’s rules, or that 
Henry had refused to take an oath which, although not established by positive law, 
had been established by custom. Moreover, it is not clear if Mills intended this 
second allegation as an independent basis to vacate Henry’s seat, or if this allegation 
was presented as evidence that the application of Article 32’s religious test made 
Henry ineligible to hold his seat. To put it another way, was Mills’s allegation that 
Henry refused to take the oath an independent basis to declare his seat vacant, 
or was this allegation evidence that Henry “denie[d] the divine authority of the 
New Testament.” Or, possibly, was it both? 
On December 6, 1809, the Commons’ Journal reported:
The house, agreeably to the order of the day, proceeded to the consideration of the resolution 
presented yesterday by Mr. Mills, for the purpose of vacating the seat of Jacob Henry, one of the 
members representing the county of Carteret in this house; and the resolution being again read, the 
house resolved itself into a committee of the whole, Mr. Love in the chair, and after some time spent 
therein, the committee rose, and Mr. Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Love reported, That the 
committee, according to order, had taken the said resolution under consideration, and that as no 
proof had been adduced in support of the charges, to induce the committee to believe that the seat 
of the said Jacob Henry ought to be vacated, they recommend that the said resolution be rejected, 
 
The house taking the foregoing report into consideration, Resolved, that they do concur there with.17 
 
   In the early national period, American state legislatures and Congress did not 
produce contemporaneous reports of their debates in their journals or other official 
records.18 In the antebellum period, state legislative journals functioned much like 
(contemporaneous and modern) court dockets—journals reported a very limited 
range of information and events. The primary items included were: the date (and, 
sometimes, the time of day) when the legislature was in session and when it was 
adjourned (or went into recess or terminated sine die); a list of its members; reports 
of the election of its presiding officer and the appointment of its staff; messages from 
16. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 12 (“That every person, who shall be chosen a member of the Senate 
or House of Commons, or appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering upon 
the execution of his office, shall take an oath to the State; and all officers shall also take an oath of office.”). 
It is curious that none of the primary or secondary sources on Jacob Henry quote the text of the oath at issue 
in 1809. Like Article 6 of the United States Constitution, Article 12 of the North Carolina Constitution of 
1776 does not provide the form or text of the constitutional oath for members of the legislature. It seems 
likely that the text of the oath mandated by Article 12 was set by statute. Eli Lederhendler, American Jewry: 
A New History (Cambridge, Engl.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 17 (“The House nevertheless voted to 
seat [Henry], regardless of the statute.”). 
17. Journal of the House of Commons, 28 (December 6, 1809). 
18. Federal practice before the early U.S. House of Representatives and Senate was not much different. “The 
Annals of Congress, formally known as The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, cover 
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the executive and messages from the other house (if the legislature were bicameral); 
titles of petitions from the public; reports of votes on orders and resolutions (which 
are themselves the parliamentary building blocks of bills); and, finally, notations 
regarding significant legislative motion practice. It is this last type of information 
that the Journal reported about the Henry motion. Thus, it is not surprising that 
one gleans very little substantive history from these two Journal entries. The Journal 
simply does not meaningfully report the debate, arguments, or evidence put forward 
by the members for and against the motion. Based on the Journal, it is not clear 
precisely what the House—acting as a committee of the whole—did or what specific 
arguments or proofs (if any) it sought or heard. We know only that the committee 
of the whole recommended rejecting the resolution, and the full house concurred 
in the recommendation. So, the primary historical puzzle is: What actually swayed 
the members to vote as they did? There is also a secondary puzzle: Why did 
Mills object to Henry’s qualifications on December 5, 1809? Why did he not do 
so when the legislature convened its annual session and the members qualified on 
November 20, 1809?19
According to the standard narrative, two primary arguments were put forward 
for rejecting Mills’s motion to declare Henry’s seat vacant. The first related to broad 
principles concerning freedom of religion and conscience, toleration, democracy, 
and equality. That argument was made by Henry in a speech in his own defense. 
The second argument was more technical. Article 32 textually extended only to 
those holding an “office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this 
State”; some members may have taken the position that members of the legislature 
do not hold “office” and so fell outside the scope of this provision.20
the 1st Congress through the first session of the 18th Congress, from 1789 to 1824. The Annals were not 
published contemporaneously, but were compiled between 1834 and 1856, using the best records available, 
primarily newspaper accounts. Speeches are paraphrased rather than presented verbatim, but the record of 
debate is nonetheless fuller than that available from the House and Senate Journals.” “Annals of Congress,” 
A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation/U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates 1774–1875, 
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html. See John V. Orth, “ ‘Fundamental Principles’ in North 
Carolina Constitutional History,” North Carolina Law Review 69 (September 1991): 1357, 1359 (“The house, 
which under the [state] constitution was the judge of its members’ qualifications, refused to exclude [Henry], 
without reported explanation.” [emphasis added]). Even if a parliamentary house did not record its debates, if its 
sessions were open to visitors, reporters could take notes of the debates. 
19. Mills failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection at the time the members took their qualification oaths. 
But see Eli Faber, “America’s Earliest Jewish Settlers, 1654–1820,” 40 (asserting that Henry “was challenged 
when he sought to take his seat”). By waiting until after the session began and until after the members-elect, 
including Henry, qualified, Mills risked that his motion would have been considered waived. See note 35, 
below. Albeit this argument is not discussed in the extant sources. 
20. As explained below, William Gaston and other members of the Commons, in fact, raised or supported 
this argument. See notes 97 to 114, 119, and accompanying text, below; see also note 112, and accompanying 
text (discussing Article 32’s “place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State”-language), 
below. 
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On December 6, 1809, according to the standard narrative, Henry gave 
a lengthy speech on his own behalf, albeit, some have suggested that the actual 
author of the speech was Judge John Louis Taylor.21 In his speech, Henry made two 
related arguments. The first was on the legal side of the ledger. He argued that the 
general freedom of religion and conscience provision in the 1776 North Carolina 
Constitution’s Declaration of Rights should trump22 the specific religious test 
provision in Article 32. After that, the bulk of Henry’s speech related to substantive 
values: toleration, democracy, and equality.
That speech was recorded in full in an 1859 collection on American oratory,23 
and also in John H. Wheeler’s 1851 history of North Carolina.24 Leon Hühner, the 
author of a twentieth-century publication with extensive material on Jacob Henry,25 
quotes from Speeches on the Jew Bill,26 a collection of essays published in Pennsylvania 
in 1829, dealing with efforts toward religious toleration of Jews in Maryland. That 
publication reported two speeches—one from 181827 and one from 182428—both of 
which mentioned Henry’s speech. Finally, Hühner notes that Henry’s speech was 
discussed in the debates of the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention.29 
Henry’s speech was not actually reproduced in these early sources from 1835, 
21. Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:74 (noting that “Mr. Henry, [gave] an able speech, said 
to be the production of Chief Justice [John Louis] Taylor”); see also notes 34 (discussing Schauinger’s view 
of the purported role of then-Judge Taylor, later Chief Justice Taylor) and 89 (discussing Marcus’s view), and 
accompanying text, below. Taylor was elected to the Superior Court in 1798. Legislative Manual 1874, 98. 
Subsequently, he became the first post-independence chief justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina—
albeit, Judge Taylor did not become chief justice until after the motion to vacate Henry’s seat had failed. 
Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, s.v. “Taylor, John Louis.” 
22. Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels, 43 (explaining that Henry argued that the North Carolina Declaration 
of Rights “took precedence over any other provisions of the state constitution”). Compare North Carolina 
Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 19 (“That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.”), with North Carolina Const. of 1776, 
art. 44 (“That the Declaration of Rights is hereby declared to be part of the Constitution of this State, and 
ought never to be violated, on any pretence whatsoever.”). Henry’s argument here is novel, and perhaps 
insightful, but there is little or no evidence that this specific argument persuaded anyone in 1809. Clement 
Eaton believed otherwise. See note 35, and accompanying text, below; see also Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of 
the United States 1654–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 50; Mary C. Segers, “A Historic 
First: The Lieberman Nomination,” in Mary C. Segers, ed., Piety, Politics, and Pluralism: Religion, the Courts, 
and the 2000 Election (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 127, 130; John E. Semonche, 
Religion and Constitutional Government in the United States: A Historical Overview with Sources (Carrboro, N.C.: 
Signal Books, 1985), 109. 
23. “Jacob Henry in the North Carolina Legislature,” in J. Agar, The American Orator’s Own Book (New York: 
C. M. Saxton, Barker and Co., 1859), 227–230. 
24. Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina, 2:74–76. 
25. Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 46–54, 68–71. 
26. Speeches on the Jew Bill in the House of Delegates of Maryland (Philadelphia: J. Dobson, 1829). 
27. “Speech of H. M. Brackenridge, Delivered in the House of Delegates of Maryland, 1818, on the Jew Bill,” 
in Speeches on the Jew Bill, 59, 90–91. 
28. “Speech of Col. J. W. D. Worthington, Delivered in the House of Delegates of Maryland, 1824, on the 
Jew Bill,” in Speeches on the Jew Bill, 101, 107 (reporting, and arguably in error, that “it was determined that 
the state test was repugnant to the [C]onstitution of the United States, and he retained his seat!—he was a Jew!”). 
29. Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, passim. 
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1829, 1824, and 1818, but the 1818 speech states that Henry’s speech had already 
been published in a book titled American Orator.30 Thus, several reasonably reliable 
reports across the decades of the antebellum period, including some reports from 
beyond North Carolina where the underlying events took place, seem to indicate 
that Henry’s speech was well received and strengthened his case to defeat Mills’s 
motion.31 Modern reports of Henry’s speech take a similar view. For example, Samuel 
A’Court Ashe’s History of North Carolina (1925) explained that Henry’s “speech 
was so superior that for several generations parts of it were embodied in books of 
elocution used in the academies of the country.”32 That said, there is a puzzle here: 
precisely where did the 1851 and 1859 collections find copies of Henry’s speech? As 
explained, it was not recorded in the Commons’ Journal. 
Indeed, modern postbellum tertiary reports of Henry’s speech are effusive with 
praise, and furthermore, some of those reports credit Henry’s speech, in whole or in 
part, with defeating the motion.33 For example, in an article in this journal, Joseph 
Schauinger wrote: 
One of the events of this session was the attempt to unseat Jacob Henry, a Federalist, on the plea that 
as he was a Jew his presence in the assembly was against that article of the state constitution which 
forbade anyone not believing in the truths of the Protestant religion to hold a state office. Henry’s 
main supporter was Gaston, who argued for religious liberty and tolerance. It has been said that 
Henry’s able defense, one of the best ever heard in a state legislature to this time, was written by the 
very able and learned Judge Taylor, who was a Republican. At any rate, the attempt [to unseat Henry] 
was a failure.34 
30. “Speech of H. M. Brackenridge,” in Speeches on the Jew Bill, 90–91. Brackenridge’s speech was from 1818. 
It does not appear that any 1818 or pre-1818 source with the title American Orator reproduces Henry’s speech. 
See note 85, below. For example, no such source appears within the collections on Internet Archive or on 
the Hathi Trust Digital Library. Even if Brackenridge erred in regard to the name of his source, it is likely 
he had some source. Andrew J. B. Fagal has suggested that the source may have been The American Speaker: 
A Selection of Popular, Parliamentary and Forensic Evidence (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, 1814), 279–282. 
See also Rosenwaike, “Further Light on Jacob Henry,” 116, 116 n. 1 (suggesting that the 1814 Philadelphia 
publication was the speech’s first reprint). 
31. Joseph L. Blau, ed., Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 89 (“[Henry’s] 
statement was clear-cut and incisive—it is a pleasure to report that it was decisive.”). In another publication, 
Blau noted that Henry’s speech “was soon recognized as a masterpiece of American oratory.” Joseph L. Blau, 
“Jacob Henry: On Religion and Elective Office,” in Daniel J. Boorstin, ed., An American Primer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1966), 219, 220.
32. Samuel A’Court Ashe, History of North Carolina: from 1783 to 1925, 2 vols. (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards and 
Broughton Printing Co., 1925), 2:207. See also J. Cutler Andrews, review of Ante-Bellum North Carolina: 
A Social History, by Guion Griffis Johnson, North Carolina Historical Review 15 (April 1938): 170, 171.
33. There are a fair number of other such sources: Blau, Cornerstones of Religious Freedom, 89 (“[Henry’s] 
statement . . . was decisive.”); see also Rosenwaike, “Further Light on Jacob Henry,” 116.
34. Joseph Herman Schauinger, “William Gaston: Southern Statesman,” North Carolina Historical Review 18 
(April 1941): 99, 106. See also note 21 (discussing Wheeler’s view of the purported role of Judge Taylor), 
above, and note 89 (discussing Marcus’s view), and accompanying text, below. Schauinger’s language is not 
quite right. First, Schauinger referred to the “truths of the Protestant religion,” but Article 32 referred to 
the “truth of the Protestant religion.” North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 32. Second, and contrary to 
Schauinger, neither Article 32 nor Mills’s resolution made use of “state office”-language. Third, Mills’s 
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resolution did not expressly state that Henry was “a Jew”; there was no such “plea.” See notes 3 and 15, and 
accompanying text, above. 
35. Clement Eaton, Freedom of Thought in the Old South (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1940), 27. 
Eaton apparently erred here. Mills’s objection was not lodged when Henry “resumed” his legislative seat; 
rather, the challenge was lodged against Henry’s continuing in a seat he had already qualified for without 
any contemporaneous objection. As the Journal indicates, Henry “appeared, qualified, and took [his] seat” 
on November 20, 1809, along with all the other members. Journal of the House of Commons, 1–2 (November 
20, 1809). It was not until some days later, on December 5, 1809, that Mills sought a vote to have the seat 
declared vacant. See note 19 (discussing absence of any contemporaneous objection by Mills), above. Eaton’s 
“tolerant atmosphere” characterization only makes sense if Henry’s Carteret County constituents knew he 
was Jewish prior to electing him in 1808 or in 1809. See also notes 92 and 149, below. 
36. Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 52.
Similarly, in a well-regarded study of freedom of expression in the antebellum 
South, Clement Eaton concluded: 
The tolerant atmosphere of North Carolina at the beginning of the nineteenth century was indicated 
by the case of Jacob Henry. Despite the fact that he was a Jew, he was elected to the legislature from 
Carteret County for a second term in 1809. When his right to resume his seat in the legislature was 
challenged, he made an eloquent speech in defense of religious liberty. Deriving his arguments from 
Thomas Jefferson, he maintained that government should concern itself with the actions of men 
and not with their speculative opinions. The Bill of Rights in the state constitution, he declared, 
annulled any provisions in that document inconsistent with the freedom of religion and of speech. 
The legislature accepted his argument, and he was allowed to serve as legislator.35 
These analyses, as well as others like them, pose some difficulty. One challenge is 
how to assess Schauinger’s claim that Henry’s speech was “one of the best ever heard 
in a state legislature to this time.” Admittedly, such a claim is a matter of opinion, 
but what is the author’s basis for making it? Eaton makes a more specific, fact-based 
claim: “The legislature accepted [Henry’s] argument.” Here, there are no citations 
to contemporaneous records, and the reader can only wonder how the author knew 
the reasoning behind the members’ individual votes. Eaton reports none, and the 
Commons’ Journal did not report any substantive debate. 
Hühner did not take the position that Henry’s speech persuaded the members. 
Hühner posited an alternate theory:
The House of Commons in permitting Henry to retain his seat, resorted to a far-fetched construction 
of the 32d Article, which emphasized rather than weakened its prohibition. The decision was based 
on the fact that the Constitution prohibited non-Protestants from holding office in any civil department 
of the State. This was interpreted not to exclude such persons from serving in the legislature. The 
legislative office, it was said, was above all civil offices. The view was more pointedly defined by saying, 
that Catholics and Jews could make the laws but could neither execute nor interpret them.36
In other words, Article 32’s proscription against non-Protestants and others 
outside the orbit of Article 32’s religious test did not reach every position in the duly 
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constituted government, that is, every position established by the state constitution 
or by state statutes. Rather, Article 32’s proscription only encompassed “office[s] 
or place[s] of trust or profit in the civil department within this State,” and that 
category, according to this view, did not include legislative seats. Hühner’s only 
reported source for this view was William Gaston, who, along with Henry, had been 
a member of the Commons in 1809. Henry was one of two members for Carteret 
County; Gaston was the single member for the town of New Bern.37 If Gaston had 
been in attendance on December 5 and 6, 1809, he would have witnessed (and, 
perhaps, participated in) the underlying events for himself.38 So Gaston might have 
been a good source. On the other hand, Hühner’s only report of Gaston’s position 
comes from an 1835 speech that Justice Gaston (who had been on the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina since 1833) gave at the North Carolina Constitutional 
Convention.39 Not only is this over twenty-five years after the 1809 proceedings, but 
the speech was made in a somewhat charged political atmosphere. 
Hühner, writing nearly a century after the underlying events, characterized 
this purported rationale of the members’ decision as “far-fetched.” This is a harsh 
condemnation for a legal position, yet this characterization has been maintained 
by subsequent commentators—including legal commentators—right through to the 
present day—even in North Carolina. For example, in a well-regarded treatise on 
North Carolina constitutional law, professor John V. Orth and Paul Martin Newby,40 
associate justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, wrote: 
37. Journal of the House of Commons, 1 (November 20, 1809). Under the 1776 state constitution, all 
senators and all members of the Commons were elected annually. Each county elected, in countywide 
elections, one senator and two members of the lower house. North Carolina Const. of 1776, arts. 1–3, 9. 
Furthermore, six towns, sometimes called “boroughs,” were identified as each having a single additional 
member in the Commons (apart from the two House members representing the entire county): Edenton, 
New Bern, Wilmington, Salisbury, Hillsborough, and Halifax, in Chowan, Craven, New Hanover, Rowan, 
Orange, and Halifax Counties, respectively. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 3. In 1789, the town of 
Fayetteville, in Cumberland County, was granted an additional House member (i.e., borough status) by the 
only constitutional amendment that preceded the 1835 state constitutional reforms. John V. Orth, “North 
Carolina Constitutional History,” North Carolina Law Review 70 (September 1992): 1759, 1769. Separate 
representation for the specially designated towns was terminated by the constitutional amendments of 1835. 
Orth, “North Carolina Constitutional History,” 1771; Legislative Manual 1874, 196, 205, 209, 244, 293, 
302, 330. 
38. As explained below, Gaston was, in fact, present, and he actively participated in the central debate on the 
motion. See notes 108 to 114, and accompanying text, below.
39. Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 52 n. 41 (“This, according to Gaston, was the ground on which 
Henry retained his seat.”); see also notes 48, 80 to 84, and accompanying text, below. Hühner cites Proceedings 
and Debates of the Convention of North-Carolina, Called to Amend the Constitution of the State, which Assembled at 
Raleigh, June 4, 1835 (Raleigh, N.C.: Joseph Gales and Son, 1836), 281. Hühner reports the same material 
published as a standalone speech by Justice Gaston. Speech of the Honorable Judge Gaston (Baltimore: Fielding 
Lucas Jr., 1835), 23. 
40. The N.C. Board of Elections voted to certify Newby, in a closely contested election, as chief justice of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina on December 13, 2020.
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In 1809 Jacob Henry, a Jew elected to the house of commons, was challenged on the basis of his 
religion. The house, which under the constitution was the judge of its members’ qualifications, refused 
to exclude him, apparently on the ground that a seat in the General Assembly was not an “Office . . . 
of Trust or Profit” within the meaning of the North Carolina Constitution, an appealing decision 
that nonetheless puts one in mind of the ingratiating query of the old Tammany Hall politician: 
“What’s the Constitution between friends?”41
On another occasion, Orth would characterize the member/officer distinction, 
i.e., one purported rationale for the Commons’ rejecting the motion to declare Henry’s 
seat vacant, as “an ingenious—one is tempted to say a talmudic—distinction.”42 Gary 
Govert, another recent legal commentator, simply adopts Hühner’s “far-fetched”43 
characterization for the members’ purported reasoning. 
There are several interrelated puzzles here. First, how did the commentators 
writing the secondary and tertiary histories reach the conclusion that the member/
officer distinction had been raised in the 1809 proceedings?44 Second, how did 
some of these commentators reach the conclusion that this reasoning led to Henry’s 
prevailing on the motion?45 Finally, and this is perhaps the most difficult puzzle to 
resolve, how did these modern commentators reach the conclusion that this rationale 
is any more “far-fetched” than any other attempt at legal reasoning, on a matter of 
first impression, in regard to interpreting the scope of obscure constitutional language 
lacking developed on-point judicial exposition?46 Furthermore, by December 6, 1809, 
when the motion to vacate Henry’s seat was decided, the 1776 North Carolina 
41. John V. Orth and Paul Martin Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 8. See also Orth, “North Carolina Constitutional History,” 1764–1765. 
42. Orth, “ ‘Fundamental Principles’ in North Carolina Constitutional History,” 1359–1360. 
43. Gary R. Govert, “Something There Is that Doesn’t Love a Wall: Reflections on the History of North 
Carolina’s Religious Test for Public Office,” North Carolina Law Review 64 (June 1986): 1071, 1080–1081. 
44. Ashe, History of North Carolina, 2:207 (asserting that the member/officer distinction was raised). 
45. W. Glenn Jonas Jr., “Introduction,” in W. Glenn Jonas Jr., ed., Religious Traditions of North Carolina: 
Histories, Tenets and Leaders (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 2018), 3 (noting that Henry “survived a 
challenge . . . after a determination that the constitutional test was not applicable to the legislature”); Powell, 
North Carolina through Four Centuries, 275; Reiss, The Jews in Colonial America, 117–118; Rogoff, Homelands, 
10. It is unclear how Hühner and these other commentators arrived at this conclusion. 
46. Richard D. Brown, Self-Evident Truths: Contesting Equal Rights from the Revolution to the Civil War (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2017), 46 (characterizing the member/officer distinction as a 
“convenient fiction”); Jacob Rader Marcus, ed., The Jew in the American World: A Source Book (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1996), 94; Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, “The Acquisition of Political and 
Social Rights by the Jews in the United States,” American Jewish Yearbook 56 (1955): 43, 57; see also note 45, 
above. Still, some modern historians, including this author, do not find this reasoning farfetched. Borden, 
Jews, Turks, and Infidels, 44 (“At first glance the ruling appears strained if not farfetched, but in fact the 
United States Senate a decade earlier, in the William Blount case, dismissed impeachment charges against 
[Blount] on the same ground: that congressmen were not ‘civil officers of the United States.’ ” [emphasis 
added]); Harold M. Hyman and Morton Borden, “Two Generations of Bayards Debate the Question: Are 
Congressmen Civil Officers?” Delaware History 5, no. 4 (September 1953): 225, 236. See generally Akhil Reed 
Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2005), 171–172. 
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Constitution was nearly thirty-three years old. As such, few of its drafters would have 
been around to ask for guidance.47 
Still, even without contemporaneous records from 1776 and from 1809, these 
later commentators had access to Justice Gaston’s views as to the scope of Article 
32’s religious test. On June 30, 1835, Gaston argued:
[Article 32] in no degree abridges the elective franchise. Every citizen, however heretical his religious 
opinions, has a right to vote in the choice of those who make the laws, or who administer to the 
service of the State. It unquestionably has no application to military offices. However dangerous may 
be supposed the religious principles of an individual, he is constitutionally qualified to command the 
military strength of the State. It is clear, too, and I suppose will be admitted by every legal gentleman, 
that the prohibitions in this Article can exclude no one from seats in the General Assembly. Whenever 
the Constitution means to exclude any man from a seat in the Legislature, it says so in express terms. 
Thus in the 25th section, it declares that no Receiver of Public Monies, &c. “shall have a seat in either 
House of the General Assembly, or be eligible to any office in this State.” A seat in the Legislature is 
above offices or places of trust in the Civil Department, and is not comprehended impliedly within 
these terms. If there had been any good reason to doubt this construction, such a doubt would have 
been removed by the adjudication of the Senate of the United States upon the impeachment of 
William Blount, and the decision of our House of Commons, in the year 1808 [sic], in the case of 
Mr. Jacob Henry, a Jew, and a representative in that body from the county of Carteret. The persons, 
therefore, whom this Article proscribes are not only qualified to choose the law-makers and to hold 
military appointments, but may themselves become the law makers of the land.48 
To be sure, Gaston, who at this time was already a justice on the North Carolina 
Supreme Court,49 was explaining the meaning of Article 32 in the context of ongoing 
political debate to reform or abolish that very constitutional provision. Although 
Hühner states otherwise,50 Gaston was not actually explaining what arguments had 
been made in 1809.51 He was merely explaining to his contemporaries in 1835 
47. For example, Samuel Johnston, a North Carolina Revolutionary leader, retired in 1803 and died in 1816. 
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, s.v. “Johnston, Samuel.”
48. Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of North-Carolina, 281. As noted by Hühner, Gaston’s speech is 
reprinted in a standalone pamphlet from 1835. The pamphlet, like the Proceedings, also misreports the date 
of the Jacob Henry case as 1808. Speech of the Honorable Judge Gaston, 23.
49. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, s.v. “Gaston, William” (“[I]n November 1833 . . . the 
General Assembly elected [Gaston] to the North Carolina Supreme Court.”). Gaston had a rich political career, 
including his election as a Federalist to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses (1813–1817). In the state 
legislature, he sometimes represented Craven County, and other times, he represented the town of New Bern, 
which is in Craven County. Ibid.; see also John L. Cheney Jr., ed., North Carolina Government, 1585–1979: 
A Narrative and Statistical History (Raleigh: North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State, 1981), 
255, 348 n. 297 (noting that, in 1808, Joshua Grainger Wright, a member for the town of Wilmington, in 
New Hanover County, was initially elected Speaker, but he resigned, and Gaston was elected in his place). 
Additionally, Gaston’s sister married Judge Taylor. Schauinger, “William Gaston: Southern Statesman,” 102; 
see also note 21, above. Marcus reports that Taylor was a Roman Catholic, but his sources do not support his 
conclusion. Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:507. 
50. Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 52 n. 41 (“This, according to Gaston, was the ground on which 
Henry retained his seat.”). 
51. Hühner’s exposition on this point is somewhat uneven. Compare Hühner, The Struggle for Religious Liberty, 
52 n. 41 (“This, according to Gaston, was the ground on which Henry retained his seat.”), and ibid., 48 (“[A] 
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the legal consequences flowing from this constitutional provision, which was then 
the subject of intense debate. That said, if Gaston’s understanding of the scope 
of Article 32’s language was sensible in 1835, it is difficult to see why it would 
have been seen as “far-fetched” in 1809 or should be seen as “far-fetched” in 2021. 
Whatever later commentators may have thought of the member/officer distinction, 
it would certainly appear that Gaston was not embarrassed to be associated with that 
position. After all, Gaston made his arguments in support of that stance in a public 
forum, where his remarks were being recorded for posterity, and he subsequently 
republished his own contribution to that public debate in a standalone pamphlet.52 
More importantly, Gaston cites as a precedent the Senate adjudication of the 
House impeachment of United States senator William Blount. That impeachment 
came about because Senator Blount, engaging in something akin to unauthorized 
foreign policy for reasons related to private commercial gain and adventure, “had 
been active in a plan to incite the Creek and Cherokee Indians to aid the British 
in conquering the Spanish territory of West Florida.”53 All this was done without 
authorization from President John Adams and his administration. After this 
information was transmitted by President Adams to the two houses of Congress, the 
House, on July 7, 1797, passed a resolution impeaching Blount.54 The next day, on 
July 8, the Senate expelled Blount.55 Notwithstanding his expulsion, impeachment 
trial proceedings would begin in the Senate on December 17, 1798.56 
In the United States Senate trial proceedings, Blount was represented by counsel. 
His lawyers explained that Article 2, Section 4 of the United States Constitution 
most curious construction of Article 32 was adopted in order to enable [Henry] to retain his seat.”), with 
Hühner, “The Jews of North Carolina Prior to 1800,” 140 (“This concession [allowing Henry to keep his 
seat] was based in part on the fiction that the constitutional prohibition . . . did not apply to members of the 
Assembly. . . .” [emphases added]). Hühner’s uneven exposition is hardly unique. For example, Orth suggests 
that this specific passage in the 1835 convention debate from Gaston was an after-the-fact justification. Orth, 
“ ‘Fundamental Principles’ in North Carolina Constitutional History,” 1359–1360 (“The house, which under 
the [state] constitution was the judge of its members’ qualifications, refused to exclude [Henry], without 
reported explanation. Later William Gaston, himself a Roman Catholic and judge of the state supreme court, 
justified the result. . . .” [emphasis added]); ibid., 1360 n. 21 (citing Gaston’s 1835 convention speech). But, 
in 1992, Orth receded from his prior position. Orth, “North Carolina Constitutional History,” 1764 (“The 
house, which under the [state] constitution was the judge of its members’ qualifications, refused to exclude 
him, apparently on the ground that a seat in the general assembly was not an ‘Office . . . of Trust or Profit’ 
within the meaning of the constitution. . . .” [citing Hühner]). 
52. Speech of the Honorable Judge Gaston, passim. It is likely that Justice Gaston was directly involved (if not 
intimately involved) in reproducing his speech from the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention in 
this free-standing pamphlet. 
53. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, s.v. “Blount, William.” See also Emily Field Van Tassel 
and Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 1787 to the Present (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999).
54. Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States of America, multiple vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales 
and Seaton, 1826), 3:72–73. 
55. Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, multiple vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 
1820), 2:392. 
56. “Blount Expulsion,” United States Senate, https://tinyurl.com/y5grq8mt. 
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states: “The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Their argument was that this clause 
was jurisdictional; in other words, the House could impeach only presidents, vice 
presidents, and “civil officers of the United States.”57 They argued that senators were 
not encompassed by that language, and therefore, senators could not be impeached. 
On Friday, January 11, 1799, the Senate, by a vote of 14 to 11, decided: “The Court 
is of [the] opinion, that the matter alleged in the plea of the defendant is sufficient in 
law to show that this Court ought not to hold jurisdiction.”58 The Court dismissed 
the entire action the following Monday. Although Blount’s lawyers made other 
arguments in support of dismissal, it appears this was the argument that carried the 
day. That said, whether or not this argument convinced the Senate’s members to 
dismiss the impeachment is beyond the scope of this article.59 Likewise, whether or 
not the Senate reached the “correct” result, that is, in reaching the conclusion that 
impeaching senators (or, at least, impeaching Senator Blount on the facts presented) 
is unconstitutional—a matter that is still debated among legal academics60—is also 
not at issue here.61 
57. There is a minority view, consistent with the United States Constitution’s text, that the language of the 
Impeachment Clause is not jurisdictional; rather, it is a mandatory removal provision. In other words, where 
an officer in one of the listed positions (i.e., president, vice president, or a civil officer of the United States) 
is impeached, tried, and convicted, then he must be removed, but the House’s power to impeach extends 
beyond the listed positions. Joseph Isenbergh, “Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial 
Process,” Yale Law and Policy Review 18 (1999): 53, 66, 66 n. 49, 98, 98 n. 207.
58. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, multiple vols. (Washington, D.C.: Gales 
and Seaton, 1851), 8:2319 (5th Cong., 3rd Sess., January 11, 1799). The journal entry cited here states 
“February 11”—this is a misprint, as is quite clear from surrounding text. 
59. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3 vols. (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and 
Co., 1833), 2:259, section 791 (“The reasoning, by which [the Senate’s decision in Blount] was sustained in 
the senate, does not appear, their deliberations having been private.”). Modern authorities remain divided. 
Compare Buckner F. Melton Jr., The First Impeachment: The Constitution’s Framers and the Case of Senator 
William Blount (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1998), 232 (“[T]he [Senate’s] resolution did not say 
whether [dismissal was appropriate] . . . because senators were not civil officers, or because of some other 
reason.”), with Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1998), 523 n. 7 (“Blount was acquitted on the ground that as a senator he was not 
a ‘civil officer’ within the meaning of the impeachment provision of the [United States] Constitution.”).
60. Some legal academics have disputed and continue to dispute the Blount decision: What was its rationale 
(if any)? Was it correctly decided? However, state and federal courts have uniformly embraced the view that 
the decision of the United States Senate in Blount was based on the member/officer distinction, and that 
the case was decided correctly. Motions Systems Corp. v. Bush, Federal Reporter Third Series, 437 (United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2006) 1356, 1373 (Gajarsa, J, concurring) (“The Senate itself has 
concluded that Senators are not ‘officers of the United States’ for purposes of the Impeachment Clause. 
. . .”); ibid., 1373 n. 12 (“This principle has been accepted since 1799. . . .”); State v. Gilmore, Kansas Reports, 
20 (Supreme Court of Kansas 1878) 551, 552 (Brewer, J) (noting that “this decision has been considered as 
applicable to members of all state legislatures”); ibid., 552 (asserting that the “question is doubtless forever 
at rest”). 
61. I have collected argument and evidence on both sides of the issue. Seth Barrett Tillman, “Interpreting 
Precise Constitutional Text,” Cleveland State Law Review 61 (2013): 285, 287 n. 9, 304 n. 42. 
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What does matter is that many, perhaps most, of those writing in the immediate 
aftermath of Blount understood the Senate’s dismissal to be based on the argument 
that senators (and by implication members of the House) were not “civil officers of 
the United States,” and so not subject to impeachment. For example, in the decade 
between the conclusion of Blount’s Senate trial in 1799 and the 1809 adjudication of 
the motion to vacate Henry’s seat, the most significant full-length treatise on United 
States constitutional law was St. George Tucker’s 1803 Blackstone’s Commentaries: 
With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Law, of the Federal Government of the 
United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia. In regard to Blount, Judge Tucker 
wrote, “It has been solemnly decided, that a senator is not a civil officer of the 
United States, and therefore not liable to impeachment.”62 Tucker expressed no 
doubt on this point. Nor was Tucker alone. In a January 1801 newspaper column 
on the consequences of the disputed Jefferson-Burr election, where both candidates 
had received the same number of electoral votes, the author, writing under the nom 
de plume Horatius, wrote: 
[U]pon the impeachment of William Blount, a distinction was taken between an officer and a member 
of Congress; and it was held that a senator was not an officer of the United States, and therefore was not 
liable to impeachment. Upon this ground, the majority of the Senate would not hold cognizance of 
that impeachment.63 
Horatius’s article apparently first appeared on January 2, 1801, in the 
Alexandria (Virginia) Advertiser and subsequently was reproduced on January 6 in 
the Washington (D.C.) Federalist, on January 16 in the Philadelphia Gazette, and on 
January 20 in the Newport (Rhode Island) Mercury. Horatius’s article may very well 
have appeared elsewhere, particularly in Federalist newspapers. Albert J. Beveridge 
was of the opinion that John Marshall’s “authorship [of Horatius] would appear to 
62. St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Law, of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: William Young Birch 
and Abraham Small, 1803), vol.1: Appendix D:335 (citing to the Blount trial record from January 7 and 10, 
1799); ibid., vol. 1: Appendix D:335 n. *. Difficulties interpreting the United States Constitution’s “office”-
language are both a long-standing and a recurring problem. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
s.v. “Tucker, John Randolph.” John Randolph, the grandson of St. George, commented on the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “office”-language. John Randolph Tucker, “General Amnesty,” North American 
Review 106, no. 260 (January–February 1878): 53, 55; see also Oliver P. Field, “The Vice-Presidency of the 
United States,” American Law Review 56 (May–June 1922): 365, 382. 
63. Alexandria (Va.) Advertiser, January 2, 3, 1801 (parts 1 and 2) (emphases added). Horatius’s article was 
reproduced widely: Washington (D.C.) Federalist, January 6, 1801; Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 
January 16, 1801; Newport (R.I.) Mercury, January 20, 1801. Horatius made reference only to “officers of the 
United States”; the word “civil” did not expressly enter his analysis. This would seem to indicate that “civil” 
merely meant civilian, and that “civil office” and “civil officers” were not used (per Horatius) as terms of art. 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 2:257–258, section 789 (suggesting that “civil” is 
used in the United States Constitution as distinguished from “military”). 
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be reasonably certain.”64 Although his opinion is not universally shared, Beveridge 
is not alone in that assessment.65 
To sum up, the secondary and tertiary sources lend some support to the view that, 
in 1809, one or more of Henry’s supporters made the argument that a legislative 
seat was not an “office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this 
State” as used in Article 32 of the 1776 North Carolina Constitution.66 Prior to 
making that argument, the United States Senate had dismissed an impeachment 
against a senator, and the then-prevailing understanding for that dismissal was that 
a senator was not an “officer of the United States” as used in the Impeachment 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Admittedly, the state and federal 
constitutional provisions at issue here do not have precisely the same language, but 
it was Gaston, speaking in public in the 1835 state constitutional convention, who 
asserted that the two cases were analogous. Given all that, and that the dispute 
about the scope of the United States Constitution’s “office”- and “officer”-language 
had been debated even during the ratification period of the federal constitution67 
and then again during the Civil War,68 it is somewhat difficult to understand why 
Hühner and later commentators have asserted that the member/officer distinction, 
purportedly asserted in the 1809 Commons proceedings, was “far-fetched.” There 
are also two other subsidiary puzzles here. As explained, the Commons’ Journal does 
not report substantive debate. First, what source (if any) did commentators in the 
secondary and tertiary literature rely upon in claiming that someone in 1809 made 
an argument against the motion to vacate Henry’s seat based on the member/officer 
distinction? Second, what justification was there for the related historical claim that 
this argument swayed the members’ votes?
64. Albert J. Beveridge, Politician, Diplomatist, Statesman, 1789–1801, vol. 2 of The Life of John Marshall 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), 541 n. 2. 
65. Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 45.
66. As explained below, newspaper reports, not developed in the largest part of the extant literature, establish 
that William Gaston and other members of the Commons, in fact, raised or supported this argument during 
the 1809 debate. See notes 97 to 114, and 119, and accompanying text, below.
67. Compare James Monroe (nom de plume A Native of Virginia), Observations Upon the Proposed Plan of Federal 
Government (Petersburg, Va.: Hunter and Prentis, 1788), in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., The Writings of 
James Monroe, Volume 1: 1778–1794 (1898; reprint, Elibron Classic Reprint, 2005), 347, 361 (“I conceive 
that the Senators are not impeachable, and therefore Governor Randolph’s objection falls to the ground.”), 
and ibid., 1:359 (“The Senators are representatives of the people; and by no construction can be considered 
as civil officers of the State.”), with Edmund Randolph at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 10, 1788), 
in Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as 
Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1836), 4:202 
(“Who are your senators? . . . They may also be impeached.”). 
68. John C. Rives, ed., Appendix to the Congressional Globe (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Globe Office, 
1864), 31, 37 (38th Cong., 1st Sess., reporting January 19, 1864 statement of Sen. James A. Bayard Jr.); see also 
Hyman and Borden, “Two Generations of Bayards Debate the Question: Are Congressmen Civil Officers?” 
231–235; Seth Barrett Tillman, “The Foreign Emoluments Clause—Where the Bodies are Buried: ‘Idiosyncratic’ 
Legal Positions,” South Texas Law Review 59 (2017): 237, 259–262 (developing the 1864 materials).
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The disparate views among commentators is rooted in linguistic confusion about 
the scope or meaning of “office.”69 The word “office” (in the English language) poses 
an interpretive challenge for modern adjudicators and historians; this is particularly 
true for those trying to understand how long-dead actors used the word “office” 
in the past. That difficulty is raised exponentially when the prior actors were 
themselves adjudicators who were trying to interpret how the word “office” was used 
in a document they did not draft and that substantially predated the adjudication. 
That is the difficulty to understanding the Henry motion and what followed. In 
2021, historians and legal scholars are trying to understand events in 1809 (and 
related events in 1835), when the substantive drama in 1809 (and the related drama 
in 1835) focused on constitutional text drafted in 1776. 
Although Conal Condren has argued that “office” embraces an entire discourse 
of meaning,70 this article makes a more limited point: the word “office” has two 
primary discrete, but closely related, valences. Sometimes “office” means simply 
“position.” Those holding an “office” in an organization, private or public, or an 
organization’s “officers,” may be anyone in the organization’s hierarchy: both apex 
and subordinate positions. 
But “office” and “officer” share another commonly used meaning. The terms 
may sometimes refer to those who are appointed, removed, and/or supervised by 
apex authority. In a monarchy (or when discussing a monarchy) or in an aristocracy 
(or when discussing an aristocracy), where apex authority is inherited, “officer” 
may sometimes refer to those who are appointed to positions by those holding a 
higher post, such as apex inherited positions. By contrast, in a democracy (or when 
discussing a democracy), where apex authority is elected, “officer” may sometimes 
refer to those who are appointed to positions by those holding a higher post, such 
as apex elected positions. In the American context, where elected positions are 
customarily instituted by a written constitution, the term “office” may sometimes 
refer to positions created by statute (or even by subsidiary regulations under the 
authority of a statute71), and the term “officer” may sometimes refer to those who 
69. I have written on the scope of the United States Constitution’s “office”-language and similar “office”-
language in state constitutions since 2008. See, for example, Seth Barrett Tillman, “Why Professor Lessig’s 
‘Dependence Corruption’ Is Not a Founding-Era Concept,” Election Law Journal 13 (June 2014): 336. 
Furthermore, regarding the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and its “office”-language, see Amicus 
Curiae Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman’s and Proposed Amicus Curiae Judicial Education Project’s Response to 
Amici Curiae by Certain Legal Historians, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Donald J. Trump, 
Civil Action Number 1:17-cv-00458-GBD (United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York September 19, 2017), Docket Number 85-1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002345. 
70. Alexander B. Haskell, “Deference, Defiance, and the Language of Office in Seventeenth-Century 
Virginia,” in Douglas Bradburn and John C. Coombs, eds., Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old 
Dominion (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 161 (discussing Condren’s views on how 
“office” was used).
71. See, for example, Geneviève Cartier, “Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial 
Abstinence?” University of Toronto Law Journal 53 (Summer 2003): 217, 223.
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are appointed to positions by those holding a higher post, such as apex elected 
positions. Thus an officer of or under the State or an officer of or under the United States72 
or an office in the civil department within this State (as used in Article 32 of the 1776 
North Carolina Constitution) may refer to those holding statutory offices73—offices 
created, regularized, or defeasible by statute—positions that in the regular order of 
business are subject to the supervision of and subordinate to elected or other apex 
authorities.74 To be clear, these are two different linguistic conventions. Which 
convention a particular document uses—and it may use both in different provisions 
(particularly if drafted at different times or by different persons)—is a decision made 
by the document’s drafters and, in a related sense, by its readers. 
Examples of “office” having two different meanings are plentiful. In the corporate 
context,75 one regularly speaks of purchasing “Directors and Officers Liability 
Insurance” or “D&O Insurance.” If it were clear that directors were officers, one 
could simplify the terminology, and instead call it “Officers Liability Insurance,” or 
one might call it, for complete accuracy’s sake, “Directors and Other Officers Liability 
Insurance.” But use of the latter phrase is virtually nonexistent. Whether “directors” 
72. See, for example, United States v. Mouat, United States Reports, 124 (Supreme Court of the United States 
1888) 303, 307 (Miller, J); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, United States 
Reports, 561 (Supreme Court of the United States 2010) 477, 497–498 (Roberts, CJ [Chief Justice]); David A. 
McKnight, The Electoral System of the United States: A Critical and Historical Exposition of its Fundamental Principles 
in the Constitution, and of the Acts and Proceedings of the Congress Enforcing It (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and 
Co., 1878), 346; Hyman and Borden, “Two Generations of Bayards Debate the Question: Are Congressmen 
Civil Officers?” 229 n. 18; Ruth C. Silva, “The Presidential Succession Act of 1947,” Michigan Law Review 
47 (February 1949): 451, 475. Of course, this view of the scope of the United States Constitution’s “office”-
language is disputed. Akhil Reed Amar, The Law of the Land: A Grand Tour of Our Constitutional Republic 
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 332 n. 8 (noting, without equivocation, that “[t]he presidency is an 
‘Office under the United States’ ”). Many legal academics, including Steven G. Calabresi, Josh Chafetz, 
John F. Manning, and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, share this view. See Tillman, “Interpreting Precise 
Constitutional Text,” 309 n. 45 (collecting authorities). 
73. Journal of the House of Commons, 4, 7 (November 22, 1809) (reporting the governor’s message, which 
stated: “The express delegation of authority to the Governor by the [state] Constitution, relative to the making 
of [temporary] appointments, extends only to officers, the right of whose appointment is by that instrument 
vested in the General Assembly; and the office of Solicitor being created by subsequent statute, it was 
doubted whether this special delegation of authority authorised an Executive appointment to that office”; 
see also North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 20.
74. A state supreme court seat is unusually difficult to characterize. Where such a position is appointed by a 
governor or other apex authority, it might be characterized as an office . . . of trust or profit in the civil department 
within this State. On the other hand, where such a position is elected (by the People or by the legislature) and/
or because such a position is generally not subject to supervision in the ordinary course of its duties, it might 
be better characterized as an apex position and, therefore, beyond the scope of Article 32’s “office”-language. 
See note 80 (explaining that Gaston’s state supreme court seat was in consequence of an election by the 
legislature), below. Gaston, a Roman Catholic, held a seat on the North Carolina Supreme Court at a time 
when the 1776 state constitution’s religious test still extended to non-Protestants. 
75. Proceedings on the Impeachment of William Blount, A Senator of the United States from the State of Tennessee, 
for High Crimes and Misdemeanors (Philadelphia: Joseph Gales, 1799), 54 (Alexander J. Dallas, attorney 
for Defendant Blount, in explicating the United States Constitution’s member/officer distinction, made 
“analogies to a Corporation”). 
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are properly characterized as “officers” is a matter that courts76 and commentators77 
have divided on. Turning from private to public law, one readily discovers British 
dictionaries, roughly contemporaneous with the framing of the 1776 North 
Carolina Constitution, employing both usages. For example, Matthew Bacon, in his 
dictionary published in London in 1768, defined “Offices and Officers” as follows: 
“The King is the universal Officer and Disposer of Justice within this Realm, from 
whom all others are said to be derived. . . .”78 Here, the king is a type of officer. But 
Comyns, in his dictionary published in London in 1766, defined “Officer” in the 
following manner: “The King is the Fountain of all Power and Authority, and by his 
Prerogative has the Nomination of all Officers originally.” Under this definition, the 
king is distinguished from “all Officers.”79 Here, the king is not a type of officer at all. 
Rather, the king is above the officers, with the prior appointing the latter. 
But it is not necessary to look to modern corporate usage or to usage abroad 
contemporaneous with 1776. Gaston80 uses this terminology in the speech he 
delivered on June 30, 1835, partially quoted above.81 He argues:
Now, if the profession of certain irreligious notions, or certain heretical religious opinions, renders 
a man necessarily unfit for the public service, he is peculiarly and emphatically an unfit depository 
76. Compare Monroe v. Scofield, Federal Reporter, Second Series, 135 (United States Court of Appeals for the 
10th Circuit 1943) 725, 726 (Huxman, J) (explaining that “[a] director is an officer of a corporation”), with 
Jackson v. County Trust Co. of Maryland, Atlantic Reporter, Second Series, 6 (Maryland Court of Appeals 1939) 
380, 382 (Sloan, J) (holding “[a] director is not an officer of a corporation”). 
77. Victoria A. Braucher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, multiple vols. (N.p.: 
Callaghan and Co., 1998), rev. vol. 2:35, section 271.
78. Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law, s.v. “Offices and Officers,” 3rd ed. (London: J. Worrall et 
al., 1768), 3:718–719.
79. John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England, s.v. “Officer” (London: H. Woodfall and W. Strahan, 1766), 
4:239. 
80. Some have hinted that Gaston was not an entirely unbiased source. Gaston was a Roman Catholic, and so 
Article 32’s proscription arguably applied to him, just as it arguably applied to Jews such as Henry and others. 
Why “arguably”? Because no court of record actually precluded Gaston or Henry from holding any position in 
North Carolina based on Article 32. But see Joseph L. Blau, “Jacob Henry: On Religion and Elective Office,” 220 
(“For Jacob Henry to hold the seat to which he had been elected violated Article 32 of the state constitution.”); 
Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:87; Leonard Rogoff, “Is the Jew White? The Racial Place of the Southern Jew,” 
American Jewish History 85 (September 1997): 195, 201 n. 14. Furthermore, all the positions Gaston held were 
apex positions: elected federal or state positions, including his service as a justice on the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. Walter F. Pratt Jr., “The Struggle for Judicial Independence in Antebellum North Carolina: 
The Story of Two Judges,” Law and History Review 4 (1986): 129, 147, 147 n. 103 (noting that “the General 
Assembly elected Gaston” in 1833); see also Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, s.v. “Gaston, 
William,” and notes 49 and 74, above. The logic of the Gaston-was-a-biased-source position, that is, biased 
because he was Roman Catholic, is odd, and perhaps worthy of its own separate paper. Proceedings and Debates 
of the Convention of North-Carolina, 270 (where Gaston explained his indifference as an “individual” in regard 
to how Article 32 might be reformed, but only sought that its scope be made “perfectly explicit” in its future 
configuration after amendment); see also James Michael Hurley, “The Political Status of Roman Catholics in 
North Carolina,” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia 38 (September 1927): 237, 271 
(“As a matter of fact, Gaston’s argument was based on the fact that it was an ambiguous and ineffective law; and 
when all was said and done, Jews were still disqualified as before and remained so until 1868.”). 
81. Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of North-Carolina, 281; note 48, above.
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of the political power and controller of the physical strength of the State. Yet this Article permits 
unbelievers and misbelievers to elect those who shall enact laws—and permits them, if the people 
so please, to enact laws themselves for the government of the whole State, and permits them to 
command the militia, by whom the laws are to be enforced. If it be safe to allow them to wield these 
powers, on what pretence can it be alledged, that it is utterly unsafe to permit their fellow-citizens to 
appoint one of them to a subordinate civil employment. . . .82 
Here, Gaston attempts to explain to his audience the scope of Article 32’s religious 
test. In other words, he considers the scope of the North Carolina Constitution’s 
“office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State”-language. 
Gaston starts his analysis by saying what this constitutional language does not 
apply to. Non-Protestants and others outside the orbit of Article 32’s religious test 
may be voters—the elective franchise is unrestricted. Non-Protestants and others 
outside the orbit of Article 32’s religious test may hold state military office. Finally, 
non-Protestants and others outside the orbit of Article 32’s religious test may hold seats 
in the legislature. After explaining what Article 32’s language does not encompass, 
Gaston turns to what Article 32’s language does concern: “subordinate civil 
employment.” In other words, the North Carolina Constitution’s “office”-language 
does not apply to apex positions but rather to “subordinate” civil positions.83 This is 
not to say that Gaston was correct in 1835 or that his speech of that year conformed 
to the Commons’ understanding of Article 32’s “office”-language in 1809 or that his 
1835 elucidation of Article 32 was consistent with that provision’s meaning as it was 
used and understood in 1776. The point here is only that Gaston’s elucidation of 
the relevant constitutional text is consistent internally and coheres with a substantial 
strand of prior usage regarding the term “office.” As Kenneth Bowling explains, in a 
somewhat related context, “In [Alexander] Hamilton’s day . . . Office under the United 
States did not extend to elected officials.”84 
82. Ibid., 281 (second emphasis added). Some courts have reached a similar conclusion regarding Blount. 
See Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, Wisconsin Reports, 4 (Supreme Court of Wisconsin 1855) 567, 
652 (Woodbury, J, concurring) (explaining that Blount held that the controlling “office”-language in the 
United States Constitution “did not embrace members of the senate, but only the subordinate civil officers of the 
government who were appointed and commissioned by the president” [emphasis added]). 
83. If Gaston were correct, then apex elected positions, such as governor, as well as members of the 
governor’s council of state, would not be controlled by Article 32. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 15 
(characterizing the governor as “elect[ed]”); ibid., art. 16 (characterizing councillors as “elect[ed]”). Recently, 
Orth has asserted that the United States Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the U.S. 
president. United States Const., art. 1, section 9, cl. 8; John V. Orth, “Unconstitutional Emoluments: The 
Emoluments Clauses of the North Carolina Constitution,” North Carolina Law Review 97 (September 2019): 
1727, 1727–1728. 
84. Declaration of Professor Kenneth R. Bowling, Ph.D. (Exhibit H), Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington v. Donald J. Trump, Civil Action Number 1:17-cv-00458-GBD (United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York September 19, 2017), Docket Number 85-9, page 4, section 16. See also 
Proceedings on the Impeachment of William Blount, 34 (Rep. James A. Bayard Sr.: “The officers, properly speaking 
under the United States are all appointed. . . .”); ibid., 35 (Bayard: “Now it is clear that a Senator is not an officer 
under the Government. The Government consists of the President, the Senate and House of Representatives; 
and they who constitute the Government, cannot be said to be under it.”).
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Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Blount and the decision on the motion to 
vacate Henry’s seat are consistent with one another, and both are broadly consistent 
with Gaston’s speech in 1835. Still, a puzzle remains: Were modern interpreters 
aware of these authorities when they characterized Gaston’s line of reasoning as 
“far-fetched”?
Other puzzles remain. Modern commentators have examined sources from 1835, 
1829, 1824, and 1818 (which refers to a prior source for Henry’s speech—American 
Orator).85 But the original source of Henry’s speech is not entirely clear. Certainly, 
the Commons’ Journal is not helpful. Gaston made an argument in his 1835 speech 
based on the member/officer distinction, but he did not positively assert that that 
he or anyone else had made that argument in the 1809 proceedings.86 
The chief question is what line of legal reasoning (if any) was used by the 
members and what motivated them (beyond legal rationales) to reject the motion to 
vacate Henry’s seat? One prominent historian, Morton Borden, notes that “Henry 
was a Federalist, Mills a Republican.”87 (And Mills might have hoped for friendly 
procedural rulings from the newly elected Speaker—Thomas Davis—who, like Mills, 
was a Republican.88) Still, Borden makes no effort to connect the Jacob Henry 
incident to any of the ideological issues that divided the two political parties. Nor 
does Borden show that the members’ votes divided on party lines. Indeed, several 
historians, including Jacob Rader Marcus, Joseph H. Schauinger, and John H. 
Wheeler, state that Judge John Louis Taylor, later Chief Justice Taylor, a Republican, 
aided Henry, a Federalist, in drafting his speech.89 Another historian, Leonard Rogoff, 
has argued that “[p]olitics lay behind the challenge” to Henry’s seat. Rogoff argues 
that the divide was between a pro-Henry Federalist “coastal gentry” and anti-Henry 
Republican “back country” sentiment, “pitting an educated, propertied elite against 
85. Henry’s speech does not appear in these sources: Increase Cooke, The American Orator (New Haven, 
Conn.: Sydney’s Press, 1811); Increase Cooke, The American Orator, 2nd ed. (Hartford, Conn.: Oliver D. 
Cooke, 1814); Increase Cooke, The American Orator (New Haven, Conn.: Sydney’s Press, 1819); Joshua P. 
Slack, The American Orator (Trenton, N.J.: Daniel Fenton, 1815). Henry’s speech does appear in an 1828 
source with that title. “Speech Delivered by Jacob Henry, in the Legislature of North Carolina, on a motion 
to vacate his seat, he being a Jew,” in Samuel Clark, The American Orator (Gardiner, Maine: Intelligencer 
Office, 1828), 46. See note 30 (discussing American Speaker, an 1814 publication), above. 
86. As explained below, William Gaston and other members of the Commons, in fact, raised or supported 
the member/officer argument during the 1809 debate. See notes 97 to 114, and 119, and accompanying 
text, below.
87. Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels, 43. See also David Hackett Fischer, “Patterns of Partisan Allegiance, 
1800,” in Lance Banning, ed., After the Constitution: Party Conflict in the New Republic (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989), 143, 169; Rogoff, Homelands, 10. 
88. “North Carolina 1809 Speaker of the House,” A New Nation Votes: American Election Returns, 1787–
1825, https://elections.lib.tufts.edu/catalog/dr26xz66h. Thomas Davis served three terms in the Commons 
as the single member for the town of Fayetteville. Legislative Manual 1874, 209; see also note 115, below. An 
1814 newspaper article described him as a general, apparently in the militia. Raleigh Star, December 23, 1814. 
89. Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:507; see also notes 21 (discussing Wheeler’s view of the purported role of 
Judge Taylor) and 34 (discussing Schauinger’s view), above.
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the greater numbers of less-educated, yeoman farmers.”90 Although the narrative 
of the Henry motion fits this broad pattern from North Carolina political history, 
Rogoff puts forward no specific evidence, apart from Henry’s and Mills’s party 
affiliations and the locations of the two counties they represented, illustrating that 
the political conflict he describes motivated the specific actors involved in the Henry 
motion. Finally, Samuel A’Court Ashe, another historian, suggests that a personality 
conflict lay behind Mills’s motion. Ashe asserts that “[d]uring th[e] [1808] session 
[Henry] contracted the ill will of another member; and being elected again in 1809, 
this member objected to [Henry’s] qualifying under the Constitution.”91 But Ashe 
supplies no authority for this mysterious claim, which has not been reported in any 
other source. In any event, it is not clear if Ashe was speaking to Mills’s having been 
reelected in 1809, or Henry’s having been reelected, or both, and records do not 
show that Mills had been a member during the 1808 session. In short, none of these 
explanations is particularly satisfactory. 
Leaving partisan loyalties and personalities aside, were the members convinced 
by Henry’s platitudinous92 (almost extra-legal) argument about religious toleration 
and freedom of conscience? Alternatively, were the members convinced by the 
more legalistic arguments brought by one or more of Henry’s purported supporters 
relating to the scope of the 1776 North Carolina Constitution’s “office”-language? 
Samuel A’Court Ashe affirmed that it was both.93 As he pointed to no sources, his 
explanation appears to be no more than an unsatisfying fudge. 
There is a third explanation—one not fully developed in the extant literature. 
A reevaluation of some newly “discovered”94 primary sources from December 
1809 and early 1810 is revealing. The December 5, 1809 motion,95 as well as 
90. Rogoff, Down Home: Jewish Life in North Carolina, 39.
91. Ashe, History of North Carolina, 2:207. It is possible that Ashe’s source was Hühner. Hühner, The Struggle 
for Religious Liberty, 46 (asserting that Mills was “actuated by some [unspecified] spiteful motive”). On the 
other hand, other historians have suggested that Mills’s motion was voted down because Henry was popular 
among the members. See note 149, below. The bases for these competing historical claims rooted in personal 
conflict and personalities are obscure.
92. In 1810, just a short time after Jacob Henry gave his celebrated speech on equality and tolerance, Henry 
owned twelve slaves. Rogoff, Down Home: Jewish Life in North Carolina, 43. 
93. Ashe, History of North Carolina, 2:207; see also Kabala, Church-State Relations in the Early American Republic, 
111 (“[T]he record is unclear as to whether the deciding factor was [Henry’s] argument based on principles of 
religious freedom or his colleagues’ argument based on legal technicalities.”).
94. Since posting a draft of this article online, further inquiries have revealed that a North Carolina state 
archivist placed a typescript manuscript on Jacob Henry in the state archives in 1984. That unpublished 
manuscript was first to uncover some of the key primary sources discussed in this article. Mary Hollis Barnes, 
“Jacob Henry’s Role in the Fight for Religious Freedom in North Carolina” (March 19, 1984), typescript 
manuscript, State Archives of North Carolina, Raleigh. Leonard Rogoff kindly flagged this to me and also 
that he had quoted from Barnes’s manuscript in his 2010 book. Rogoff, Down Home: Jewish Life in North 
Carolina, 40, 381 n. 51. 
95. Raleigh Star, December 7, 1809 (reporting December 5, 1809 motion). 
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the December 6 vote on that motion,96 were reported in a Raleigh newspaper 
on December 7. These initial reports had little more to say than the Commons’ 
Journal. A December 14, 1809, out-of-state newspaper report was more expansive—it 
summarized the arguments made in debate.97 Also, on December 14, 1809, Henry’s 
speech was reported, in full, in a North Carolina newspaper, and in 1810, it was 
reported, in full, in other North Carolina newspapers.98 Afterward, in early 1810, 
it was reported, in full, in other newspapers around the United States.99 Finally, 
one Raleigh newspaper reported the members’ debate, apparently in full.100 This 
information was probably lost on (nearly all) modern commentators for two reasons. 
First, there was no strong reason to look for the original or first contemporaneous 
written report of Henry’s speech. Once the speech had entered the public domain, 
people made do with what was on hand. Second, the remaining debate was not 
reported contemporaneously with Henry’s speech; instead, it was strung out over 
several subsequent newspaper reports from late December 1809 into January 1810, 
with related letters to the editor following in February. This is likely why these later 
debates were almost entirely overlooked by subsequent commentators.101 It would 
appear that few thought to examine newspaper reports a month or more after the 
events. Indeed, many then and now relied upon Gaston’s understanding of Article 
96. Raleigh Star, December 7, 1809 (reporting December 6, 1809 vote on the motion). One academic has 
characterized the December 6, 1809 debate—taking shy of one legislative day—as a “prolonged contest.” Delbert 
Harold Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, 1789–1816 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1931), 181 n. 6. See also Jon Meacham, American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the Making of a Nation 
(New York: Random House, 2007), 108 (characterizing the Jacob Henry incident as a “standoff”). 
97. Charleston (S.C) Strength of the People, December 14, 1809 (summarizing floor debate). 
98. Raleigh Star, December 14, 1809 (reporting Henry’s speech in full); see also ibid., February 1, 1810 
(reporting a letter to the editor from “A Carolinian,” and the editor’s noting that Henry’s speech had already 
been reported in “Richmond, Baltimore &c”); Carolina Federal Republican (New Bern), February 12, 1810. 
One historian took the position that Henry’s “speech” in his own defense was a letter he had written to 
the Commons’ other members. See Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:507 (“On the following day, the 6th of 
December, 1809, after consulting with eminent Christian jurists, Henry wrote a letter to his colleagues in the 
House of Commons.”). It appears that Marcus is suggesting that Henry consulted not just with Judge Taylor, 
but also with William Gaston. 
99. Charleston (S.C.) Strength of the People, January 4, 1810; see also Charleston (S.C.) City Gazette and Daily 
Advertiser, February 3, 1810; Carolina Gazette (Charleston, S.C.), February 6, 1810 (referring to “Henry 
Jacobs”); Charles Town (Va.) Farmer’s Repository, February 9, 1810 (referring to “Henry Jacobs”); Savannah 
(Ga.) Republican, February 10, 1810; Lexington (Ky.) Reporter, February 17, 1810 (referring to “Henry Jacobs”); 
New-York Journal, February 28, 1810; Miller’s Weekly Messenger (Pendleton, S.C.), March 3, 1810 (referring 
to “Henry Jacobs”); Danbury Connecticut Intelligencer, March 4, 1810; Milledgeville Georgia Journal, March 27, 
1810; Pittsburgh Gazette, May 11, 1810. Any number of newspapers—in Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia—
ascribed Jacob Henry’s speech to “Henry Jacobs.” Ibid. See also Lindo, A Jewish Calendar for Sixty-Four Years, 
132 (referring to “Henry Jacobs” and using 1810 as the year of his election).
100. Raleigh Star, December 28, 1809 (reporting Gaston’s speech, where he advanced the member/officer 
argument); ibid., January 4, 1810 (reporting further debate in support and opposing Gaston); ibid., January 
4, 1810 (reporting committee proceedings, including hearing witnesses, and reporting the House’s hearing 
and adopting, without reported objection, the committee’s recommendation). 
101. See note 94 (discussing Barnes’s and Rogoff’s publications), above. 
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102. Raleigh Star, December 7, 1809. The editor of the Star was Thomas Henderson Jr. In late 1810, Henry 
corresponded with Henderson. A. R. Newsome, “A Miscellany from the Thomas Henderson Letter Book,” 
North Carolina Historical Review 6 (October 1929): 398, 398–400. A “Thomas Henderson” is listed as serving 
in the Commons in 1809 and for six other terms for Mecklenburg County. See Cheney, North Carolina 
Government, 153, 155, 165, 167, 228, 234, 245, 247, 248, 252, 253, 257, 259, 1201–1202. Thus, Jacob 
Henry and Thomas Henderson both served in the Commons in 1809. It is hardly clear if the Commons 
member for Mecklenburg by this name was also the Star’s editor—if so, it would certainly go far to explain 
the Star’s detailed reporting of the events. Multiple sources, including the Raleigh Star, describe Thomas 
Henderson, Jr. as a colonel. See Marvin Downing, “John Christmas McLemore: 19th Century Tennessee 
Land Speculator,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 42 (Fall 1983): 254, 261. 
103. E-mail from James White, House Principal Clerk, North Carolina House of Representatives, supports 
this interpretation of the Commons’ Journal. 
104. A recorded vote could be had “upon a [mere] motion made and seconded . . . upon any question. . . .” 
North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 46. By contrast, under the United States Constitution, a recorded vote 
requires support from one-fifth of the members voting. United States Const., art. 1, section 5, cl. 3.
105. Carolina Federal Republican (New Bern), February 12, 1810 (reproducing a letter to the editor noting that 
Mills’s motion to vacate Henry’s seat had been “unanimously rejected”); see also Raleigh Star, January 18, 1810.
106. Raleigh Star, December 14, 1809. 
32 from the 1835 constitutional convention debates as representative of the prior 
debate from 1809. As will be seen, those commentators were not entirely wrong to 
do so. 
So what do these sources suggest? On December 7, 1809, the Raleigh Star 
reported that Mills put forward his resolution on December 5. For December 6, the 
same issue of the Star reported: “The allegations were disproved and the resolution 
unanimously rejected.”102 The Journal does not indicate that there was a recorded 
vote; apparently there was only a voice vote. It seems likely that a Star journalist 
witnessed the voice vote and did not hear any “ayes” in support of the motion. On 
that basis, the journalist may have reasoned that the motion had been unanimously 
rejected.103 If this were the basis of the newspaper’s report of the vote, then the 
journalist’s conclusion is not entirely unreasonable, but it is certainly not sound.104 
Other newspapers also reported that the vote was unanimous, but it is unclear if 
they arrived at this conclusion based upon independent reporting and sources of the 
underlying events or if these other newspaper reports were themselves relying on the 
Star’s reporting.105 Unanimity, the lack of a recorded vote showing how the members 
voted, or both all point to the possibility that partisan and political loyalties played 
little role in the House’s decision. 
The December 7 article in the Star also stated that the allegations were “disproved.” 
This is broadly consistent with the Journal, which reported that “no proof had been 
adduced in support of the charges.” But the reader can only wonder what precisely 
was meant by these words. What facts were “disproved”? Regarding what specific 
issue or issues was there a failure of proof? 
Later newspaper reports provided more clarity. On December 14, 1809, the 
Star published Henry’s speech in full.106 It reported that the speech followed Mills’s 
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On December 14, 1809, the Charleston (S.C.) Strength of the People reported details on events in the North Carolina 
legislature from December 5 and 6, 1809. Newspaper from Genealogy Bank.
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motion, but it is not clear whether Henry delivered his speech on December 5 or 6. 
As explained, the speech subsequently appeared in other newspapers around the 
country. It seems likely that the Star was the source for these reports. The speech 
closes with an editor’s note: “[Debate to be continued.]” The latter would seem to 
indicate that Henry’s speech was part of the substantive exchanges that took place on 
December 6. Apparently, on December 5, Mills’s resolution was read, and all further 
consideration was adjourned until the following day. Again, this seems to indicate that 
Henry’s speech was given on December 6. 
Furthermore, on December 14, 1809, a second newspaper, the Charleston (S.C.) 
Strength of the People reported on events in the North Carolina legislature from 
December 5 and 6, 1809.107 The report for December 5 is consistent with the Journal 
entry. But that describing the events of December 6 offers some further details. 
This report, appearing in the Strength of the People, confirms that an argument 
based on the member/officer distinction was not made for the first time by Gaston 
in the 1835 North Carolina Constitutional Convention, but, in fact, had been made 
in 1809—although the member or members who had made that argument were not 
identified. More importantly, this newspaper article also helps solve another puzzle. 
The Journal reported for December 6 that “no proof had been adduced in support 
of the charges.” Here, the newspaper report frames the key issues investigated by the 
Commons as Henry’s “being a Jew, and having refused to qualify upon the New 
Testament.” It seems that these two issues (i.e., assuming that they were understood 
as distinct from one another) may have been the factual matters about which no 
proof or evidence (as opposed to some failure of legal argument) had been heard. 
Two newspaper reports from the Raleigh Star, from December 28, 1809, and 
January 4, 1810, include much new detail about the December 6, 1809 proceedings. 
The December 28, 1809 article, returning to the events of December 6, reported that 
Mills opened the day’s debate by attempting “to introduce evidence to substantiate 
the charges contained in the Resolution.” Mills was opposed by Gaston. Gaston 
argued that if evidence were to be taken, then the matter should go to “a select 
committee or a committee of the whole.” But Gaston then turned from contested 
facts to contested constitutional law. He argued that the motion should be dismissed 
as a threshold matter, without going to any committee and with no need to hear any 
evidence, under what amounts to the modern motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim standard.108 In other words, “it was unnecessary to proceed further with [the 
inquiry]. In his judgment, even were the facts charged in the resolution ascertained 
to be true, the member implicated was entitled to retain his seat. If so this unpleasant 
107. Charleston (S.C.) Strength of the People, December 14, 1809.
108. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the following defense by motion . . . 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . .”). 
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enquiry is at an end.” Indeed, the rest of newspaper report is largely Gaston’s lengthy 
speech laying out the member/offi  cer argument in considerable detail.
Gaston made several important points. He noted that Henry’s case was the fi rst 
time an Article 32-related case was being adjudicated by the legislature. He noted 
further that the stakes were high—as this case touches on the “right of the people 
to choose their representatives.” He then acknowledged that the “general words” 
of Article 32 are “capable of being construed so as to apply to the present case.” 
Nevertheless, Gaston rejected that conclusion. He turned to other constitutional 
provisions to establish that where the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 authorizes 
limitations to legislative service, it does so expressly, and not by implication. In other 
words, general “offi  ce”-language does not apply to legislative seats. Gaston pointed to 
Article 25 of the state constitution, which states: 
That no persons, who heretofore have been, or hereafter may be, receivers of public the [sic] monies, 
shall have a seat in either House of [the] General Assembly, or be eligible to any offi  ce in this State, until 
such person shall have fully accounted for and paid into the treasury all sums for which they may he 
accountable and liable.109
Gaston reasoned that if seats in the legislature were “offi  ces,” then the italicized 
language was superfl uous. Naturally, he took the opposite position: it is precisely 
because such language is not superfl uous, and because seats in the legislature are 
not “offi  ces,” that Article 25 needed additional, express language to reach legislative 
109. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 25, as reported in Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, 
5:2792 (emphasis added). The language reported by Thorpe for Article 25 is odd: it appears the word “the” 
is in the wrong place. 
William Gaston, along with Henry, had been a member of the Commons in 1809. Henry was one of two members 
for Carteret County; Gaston was the single member for the town of New Bern. On December 28, 1809, the Raleigh 
Star published portions of Gaston’s argument against the resolution denying Henry a seat in the General Assembly. 
Newspaper from Genealogy Bank. 
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positions. Gaston made similarly structured arguments based on the language of 
Articles 12, 26, 27, 28, and 35.110 
After discussing the text, Gaston made arguments more rooted in constitutional 
structure or design: Gaston’s use of the term “office” here tracks the definition and 
usage in Comyns’s dictionary. The elected legislature is the apex; officers hold positions 
subordinate to apex authority. 
Gaston then turned to the Blount case. He asserted: “That the construction now 
contended for is the true one, a decision of the highest court of judicature of this 
country has placed beyond the possibility of doubt”111 and concluded that the United 
States “Constitution made Officers only liable to impeachment” but not members of 
the legislature. 
Next, Gaston turned to a potential technical problem with his reading. The 
controlling language in Article 32 is “any office or place of trust or profit in the 
civil department within this State.” Here, Article 32 speaks to both “office[s]” and 
“place[s].” Thus, even if Blount were persuasive regarding understanding the state 
constitution’s “office . . . of trust or profit in the civil department”-language, could a 
legislative seat be a “place of trust or profit in the civil department”? Gaston’s answer 
was: “the word place impl[ies] in common language a station of a subordinate kind, 
something of less dignity than an office. . . .” Gaston’s rationale regarding “place” 
would have extended to state employment or something akin to civil service positions. 
Under that formulation, Article 32’s “office or place of trust or profit”-language could 
not extend to legislative seats (or, indeed, to any other elected positions).112 
Gaston closed with the argument that Mills’s motion should not be referred 
to a committee to take evidence because Henry should prevail as a matter of state 
constitutional law, even if the facts alleged by Mills were taken as true. But before he 
made that argument, he returned to public policy. The nagging objection to Gaston’s 
argument is: Why would the framers of the state constitution impose a religious test on officers, 
but not on seats in the legislature? Gaston responded: “The answer is easy. It was believed 
to be an object of the highest importance to the preservation of liberty and the true 
representative principle, that the people should be left free as air to their choice.”113 
110. For example, Article 12’s “office”-language is similar to Article 25’s “office”-language. See notes 16 and 
109, above. 
111. Here, Gaston is referring to the United States Senate as a court of impeachment, and not to the United 
States Supreme Court. See Proceedings on the Impeachment of William Blount, 19.
112. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court of North Carolina would address this very issue. The court’s 
view was not ad idem with Gaston’s. Doyle v. Raleigh, North Carolina Reports, 89 (Supreme Court of North 
Carolina 1883) 133, 135–136 (Smith, CJ); Worthy v. Barrett, North Carolina Reports, 63 (Supreme Court of 
North Carolina 1869) 199, 201–202 (Reade, J). 
113. Contesting Gaston’s position, William Blackledge, one of two House members for Craven County, who 
spoke later in that day’s debate, stated: “The Convention [that framed the state constitution] did not mean, 
as has been said, to leave the people as free as air to their choice—it has forbidden them to choose [p]arsons.” 
See North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 31; notes 118, 135 to 147, and accompanying text, below. 
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Of course, Gaston opened his defense for Henry on this very point.114 
On January 4, 1810, some twenty-nine days after the underlying events, the 
Star reported the remainder of the debate from December 6, 1809. Many members 
participated in the fast-paced discussion on whether to commit Mills’s resolution 
to a committee and on whether to accept the member/officer distinction. Daniel 
Glisson, one of two House members for Duplin County, was one of the first to 
speak.115 He stated that Gaston erred in arguing the scope of Article 32 to the full 
house; rather, the legal question (and, by implication, any contested factual issues) 
should be directed to some committee. 
William E. Webb, one of two House members for Halifax County, spoke next. 
He largely agreed with Gaston. There was no reason to investigate contested facts 
“when it was very probable if all the alleged facts were substantiated, the House would 
not be prepared to say that they amounted to a constitutional disqualification.” 
Webb concluded by noting that if the House reached a determination that the 
allegations were sufficient for disqualification, then “it would be in proper course 
to enquire whether the allegations were true.” This is akin to the standard used in 
the modern motion for summary judgment where a material fact is not disputed.116 
Essentially, Webb wanted Henry to have two bites at the apple: dismissal based on 
an insufficient legal theory, and dismissal based on insufficient evidence to prove 
that theory.
William Drew,117 the single member for the town of Halifax, spoke next. Drew, 
much like Henry, argued in favor of freedom of conscience. He then argued that the 
alleged facts, even if true, did not support disqualification. He reasoned:
[I]t was objected that [Henry] refused to swear upon the New Testament when he qualified as a 
member of this House. Does the law say what a man shall swear upon? It is all the same if he binds his 
conscience, whether he swears upon Mahomet’s Koran, the Bible, or New Testament.
114. See generally Paul Finkelman, “James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity,” Supreme 
Court Review (1990): 330. 
115. Gaston was speaker of the Commons during part of the 1808 legislative term. See note 49, above. At the 
start of the 1809 session, Daniel Glisson nominated Gaston for another term as speaker. But Thomas Davis, 
the single member for the town of Fayetteville, was elected instead. J. Herman Schauinger, William Gaston: 
Carolinian (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1949), 54; see also note 88, above. Glisson served as 
Duplin County sheriff from 1790 to 1793, and then again from 1812 to 1816. Faison Wells McGowen 
and Pearl Canady McGowen, Flashes of Duplin’s History and Government (Kenansville, N.C.: Edwards and 
Broughton Co., 1971), 544. Glisson had a twenty year-long legislative career representing Duplin County: 
serving in the Commons for fourteen terms (including 1809) and serving in the Senate for six terms. 
Legislative Manual 1874, 220. But see Raleigh Register, and North-Carolina Gazette, March 18, 1828 (reporting 
“Major Daniel Glisson” serving “thirty six years” in the legislature). 
116. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”). William E. Webb was one of two House members for Halifax County; he served four terms in the 
Commons. Legislative Manual 1874, 245. 
117. Drew had a solid political career, with five House of Commons terms as the single member for the 
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It is not entirely clear what Drew meant by “the Bible.” Perhaps he was speaking of 
a traditional Christian text—Hebrew Canon and Christian Testament, as opposed to 
a book just including the latter. Whatever he meant, no member directly responded, 
in the remainder of the debate, to his legal argument. 
Drew concluded by refusing to address the constitutional issue directly. Instead, 
Drew’s contribution to the debate indicated that he did not want to be an inquisitor 
or to be seen as an inquisitor. The diffi  culty with Drew’s position is that Article 32 
calls for a religious test of some sort against the holders of some (yet to be determined) 
state positions in, at least, some set of circumstances. Considering Drew’s contribution 
to subsequent proceedings, it appears that more was going on here than a plea for 
toleration. Drew was arguing self-protection. In other words, if the members were to 
go down this path, they and their chamber would look like fools. 
The next speaker was William Blackledge—one of two House members for Craven 
County. Blackledge thought it would be improper for the committee of the whole 
to collect evidence. Instead, he urged that the issue should be determined in a select 
committee or the committee of elections. He spoke to Henry’s supporters directly: 
“he tho’t if the friends of Mr. Henry urged a decision without such an enquiry into 
facts, they would endanger his seat; for their arguments were a tacit admission that 
William Drew, the single Assembly member for the town of Halifax, argued in favor of freedom of conscience. 
Raleigh Star, January 4, 1810. Newspaper from Genealogy Bank.
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he had no religion.” Perhaps Blackledge thought that the gravamen of the Article 32 
charge against Henry was that Henry “den[ied] the being of God.”118 
William W. Jones, who appears to be one of the two House members for Onslow 
County, spoke next.119 He supported Gaston’s position: “it was plain that [Article 
32] did not go to affect the seats of Representatives in this House.” 
Mooring was the last member to speak in debate before the full House. He argued 
that the whole matter—facts and law—should go to the committee of the whole. But 
no Mooring is listed in the House Journal by the returning officers among the persons 
who had been duly elected to the Commons. Perhaps it was Laurence Moore—one 
of two House members for Anson County.120 Alternatively, it may have been John 
Moring—one of two House members for Pitt County.121 In any event, Mooring’s 
advice was followed, and the entire matter was sent to the committee of the whole. 
The chair of the committee of the whole was held by Gen. Thomas Love—one of 
two House members for Haywood County.122 The newspaper report indicates that 
four witnesses, all of whom were members of the legislature, were identified and 
then “called to the Bar [of the House] to give testimony.”123 Three witnesses were 
members of the Commons: Roberts, Joseph Pickens (Buncombe County),124 and 
town of Halifax, and in 1816, he was elected attorney general by the legislature. Legislative Manual 1874, 244; 
Ready, The Tar Heel State, 172.
118. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 32. Blackledge served in the Commons for four terms. Additionally, 
Blackledge held a congressional seat from 1803 to 1809. In the election of 1810, Blackledge defeated Gaston 
for a seat in the 12th Congress (1811 to 1813); in the election of 1812, Gaston defeated Blackledge for a 
seat in the 13th. Schauinger, “William Gaston: Southern Statesman,” 107–108. During his congressional 
service, Blackledge affiliated with the Republican Party. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, s.v. 
“Blackledge, William ([?]–1828)”. One of Blackledge’s obituaries reported that “[f]or many years he was a 
member of the Council of State of North Carolina.” Washington (D.C.) Daily National Intelligencer, November 
1, 1828. In the December 6, 1809 debate, Blackledge opposed Gaston on several points. See note 113, above.
119. William Jones was one of two House members for Onslow County, and he served in the House for two 
terms. Legislative Manual 1874, 300. 
120. Journal of the House of Commons, 1–2 (November 20, 1809) (spelling “Laurence” with a “u”). “Lawrence 
Moore” served in the House of Commons from 1807 to 1809, and in the state senate from 1814 to 1816. 
Legislative Manual 1874, 158. Apparently, “[h]e served his country as a soldier during the Revolutionary 
[W]ar.” Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi, 2 vols. (Chicago: Goodspeed Publishing Co., 1891), 
vol. 2: Part 1:459. 
121. Journal of the House of Commons, 1–2 (November 20, 1809) (spelling “Moring” with a single “o”). “John 
Mooring” served as one of the two House members for Pitt County between 1804 and 1809. Legislative 
Manual 1874, 315. 
122. Thomas Love served in the House for ten terms for Buncombe County, then served in the House 
in 1809 for the first of nine terms for Haywood County, and, finally, served in the Senate six terms for 
Haywood County, ending in 1828. Legislative Manual 1874, 173, 249. Love’s title, “General,” may have 
been in connection with the part he played in the late 1780s opposing the State of Franklin and supporting 
reintegration of North Carolina’s western counties back into North Carolina. History of Carroll County, 
Tennessee, multiple vols. (Paducah, Ky.: Turner Publishing Co., 1986), 1:240. In 1839, after he had moved to 
Tennessee, Love was elected to the state senate, and was afterward chosen as Speaker of the Senate from the 
Western District of Tennessee. History of Carroll County, 1:240. 
123. Raleigh Star, January 4, 1810.
124. Joseph Pickens was one of two House members for Buncombe County, serving three terms in the 
House. Legislative Manual 1874, 173.
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Belcher Fuller, the single senator for Carteret County, “said he knew nothing of Mr. Henry’s religion.” Raleigh Star, 
January 4, 1810. Newspaper from Genealogy Bank.
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Samuel M’Guire (Chowan County).125 One witness was a member of the Senate, 
Belcher Fuller (Carteret County).126 The report also shows that the committee of the 
whole heard from two other witnesses—John S. Nelson, one of two House members 
for Craven County,127 and the clerk of the Commons, Pleasant Henderson.128 
The members who were specifically identified as posing questions to the witnesses 
included William Drew (who had also participated in the debate prior to the 
committee of the whole’s interrogation of the witnesses) and Joel Cherry—one of 
two House members for Martin County.129 
Roberts was not listed in the House’s Journal by the returning officers among those 
persons who had been duly elected to the Commons. There was a John Robards130—
who, like Henry, was one of two House members for Carteret County. Roberts was 
likely Robards.131 Belcher Fuller was the single senator for Carteret County—again, 
the same county as Jacob Henry and John Robards. Because all three represented 
the same county, it would not be particularly surprising if they knew one another 
before the 1809 proceedings. And, of course, it is likely that the members of the 
committee of the whole thought that those who already knew Henry would make 
some of the most useful witnesses. Moreover, Jacob Henry and Belcher Fuller were 
both from the county seat of Beaufort and may have lived just a few blocks from one 
125. Samuel M’Guire (or McGuire) was one of two House members for Chowan County. He served seven 
terms in the House. Legislative Manual 1874, 197. 
126. Belcher Fuller served in the Senate for five terms continuously from 1809 to 1813. Legislative Manual 1874, 
185. During the War of 1812, it appears Fuller was a private in the state militia company that Capt. Jacob 
Henry commanded. See “Pay Voucher: Belcher Fuller,” North Carolina Digital Collections, https://digital.
ncdcr.gov/digital/collection/p16062coll7/id/4302; Rogoff, Down Home: Jewish Life in North Carolina, 43. 
Fuller was also “a notary public, justice of the peace, and lieutenant colonel of militia in 1823.” Newsome, “A 
Miscellany from the Thomas Henderson Letter Book,” 400 n. 7. Fuller’s elevation from private to lieutenant 
colonel in roughly a decade seems a meteoric rise. 
127. John S. Nelson, one of two House members for Craven County, served ten terms in the House. 
Legislative Manual 1874, 206. In 1809, the other House member for Craven County was William Blackledge, 
and Gaston represented the town of New Bern, which is in Craven County. See notes 49 and 113, above.
128. Journal of the House of Commons, 2 (November 20, 1809); Raleigh Star, January 4, 1810. Pleasant 
Henderson had a long and varied political and military career, in which he reached the rank of major during 
the American War of Independence. He held the position of clerk of the Commons continuously from 1807 
to 1830, and it was the last public office he held. Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, s.v. “Henderson, 
Pleasant.” 
129. Joel Cherry was one of two House members for Martin County. He served nine terms in the House. 
Legislative Manual 1874, 278–279. 
130. Journal of the House of Commons, 1–2 (November 20, 1809). 
131. John Robards was one of two House members for Carteret County in 1809. Journal of the House of Commons, 
1–2 (November 20, 1809). He served twelve continuous terms in the House from 1804 to 1815. In 1816, he 
served one term in the Senate. Legislative Manual 1874, 185. The highest-ranking militia officer in Beaufort, 
during the War of 1812, was Lt. Col. John Roberts. John W. Moore, History of North Carolina: From the Earliest 
Discoveries to the Present Times, 2 vols. (Raleigh, N.C.: Alfred Williams and Co., 1880), 2:446. Is it possible 
that these records are somehow confused—and that Robards and Roberts were the same person? See Cheney, 
North Carolina Government, 255 (listing members of the 1808 House of Commons, including John Robards, 
Willliam Robards, and Jacob Henry), 257 (listing members of the 1809 House of Commons, including John 
Roberts and Jacob Henry), 1085–1086 (listing historical members of the legislature for Carteret County).
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another. Afterward, they would serve together in the War of 1812, and they had 
some common commercial contacts.132 
The Star reported on the committee of the whole’s interrogation of the witnesses: 
Several things are noticeable from this exchange.133 First, Jacob Henry was not 
called as a witness,134 nor is there any indication that Henry interrogated any of the 
witnesses. Second, the issue was not primarily whether Henry was born Jewish or 
whether he, in his own mind or conscience, adhered, intellectually or theologically, 
to Judaism, or to some other non-Protestant religion. Rather, the precise legal issue 
was defined by Article 32’s language: that is, Did Henry “deny the being of God 
or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old 
or New Testaments”? There had to be evidence—by observable word or deed—that 
Henry actively and, perhaps, publicly “denied” what was required under the religious 
test. As no one had firm firsthand knowledge what book Henry swore his oath on, 
what he ate, or what religion (if any) he practiced, there was no concrete evidence 
of his having “denied” anything. Finally, the only persons expressly identified as 
having asked the witnesses questions were Drew and Cherry. Indeed, Cherry asked 
only a single question; Drew asked all the other questions (where the person posing 
the question was identified). Moreover, the exchange above seems to indicate that 
Drew, who was posing questions like a religious inquisitor, was Henry’s opponent. 
But perhaps this was all for affect. Drew’s questions illustrate how ridiculous the 
members looked (or would look to others, and to posterity) just by asking these 
questions. It is unlikely that anyone—including Mills and Henry—was pleased with 
how the Star reported the testimony from the committee of the whole. 
The report closed by noting that “the Committee rose and [r]eported, [t]hat 
having had the subject under consideration, recommend that the resolution [to 
vacate Henry’s seat] be rejected—which was concurred in unanimously” by the full 
House. One does wonder: Did Mills vote against his own motion? 
132. Jacob Henry’s house is located at 229 Front Street, Beaufort, North Carolina. Henry purchased the 
property in 1794. National Register of Historic Places Inventory—Nomination Form, https://files.nc.gov/
ncdcr/nr/CR0005.pdf. Mary Warshaw, “Fuller Family—Beaufort NC,” More Beaufort, North Carolina 
History (“The block in Beaufort adjoining Orange Street, Ann Street, Turner Street and Front Street was 
known as Fuller land.” [emphasis added]), https://tinyurl.com/yxgphp8d. See notes 7 and 126 (describing 
Fuller’s and Henry’s militia service during the War of 1812), above. Circa 1810, it appears that Sen. Belcher 
Fuller settled Henry’s account with the Raleigh Star, which may have been the first newspaper to report 
Henry’s 1809 speech in full. Newsome, “A Miscellany from the Thomas Henderson Letter Book,” 400 n. 7. 
133. Many participants in the Henry proceedings had or would go on to have substantial military or militia 
experience. In total, there were two generals, a lieutenant colonel, two majors, a captain, and a soldier in the 
Henry proceedings. See notes 7, 88, 115, 120, 122, 126, and 128, above. Furthermore, Thomas Henderson 
Jr., the Star’s editor, was also described as a “colonel,” but for what military or militia service (if any) is 
unclear. See note 102, above. 
134. Perhaps this is not all that surprising. In the common law world, prior to modern statutory reforms, 
parties in civil cases were precluded from appearing as witnesses. In England, the restriction against parties’ 
appearing as witnesses in civil cases was not swept away until legislative reforms during the 1840s and 
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Philip S. Foner wrote that Henry’s speech “made a profound impression on 
progressive Americans by a brilliant reply to narrow-minded bigots.”135 If the North 
Carolina political world of 1776, 1809, or 1835 were inhabited by a substantial 
number of “narrow-minded bigots,” would there not be a rich history of attempts 
to exclude religious nonconformists? Instead, there is a very thin record of such 
efforts.136 Has anyone uncovered anything like discussion or debate, much less active 
political efforts, to exclude Justice Gaston from his high office? Aside from Hugh 
C. Mills, is there any reason to believe that any of Jacob Henry’s colleagues in the 
Commons in 1809—or, even, any of the drafters of the 1776 state constitution—
were narrow-minded or bigots? Is it possible that Article 32 itself was not rooted in 
parochialism and bigotry directed against non-Protestants? If one accepts Gaston’s 
wider perspective, i.e., that Article 32 had a limited bite,137 one might even suspect 
that the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 and Article 32 were rooted, in part, 
in disestablishment-related values.138 
One might also consider Article 32’s constitutional neighbor, Article 31, which 
provided: “That no clergyman, or preacher of the gospels of any denomination, shall 
be capable of being a member of either the Senate, House of Commons, or Council 
of State, while he continues in the exercise of the pastoral function.”139 “In 1801, the 
Reverend John Culpepper and the Reverend William Taylor were declared ineligible 
and expelled from their seats in the state senate. In 1820, the Reverend Crudup met 
1850s, and the restriction against defendants’ appearing as witnesses in criminal cases continued until late 
nineteenth-century legislative reforms. Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 12th ed. (Oxford, Engl.: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 40, 223, 223 n. 2, 324, 324 n. 2. On the other hand, although he was not 
called as a witness, Henry did give a speech in his own defense, notwithstanding that he was an interested party. 
Perhaps this explains Blau’s mysterious suggestion that Henry’s speech arose in connection with “a special 
privilege.” Joseph L. Blau, “Jacob Henry: On Religion and Elective Office,” 220. Of course, parliamentary 
inquiries—such as the Henry motion—are not precise analogues to either judicial civil or criminal proceedings. 
135. Philip S. Foner, The Jews in American History 1654–1865 (New York: International Publishers Co., 1945), 34.
136. See notes 4 and 6, above. Stephen Beauregard Weeks, Church and State in North Carolina (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1893), 265–266 (explaining that no one contested Gaston’s holding a seat on the state 
Supreme Court). 
137. See notes 48, 80 to 84, and accompanying text, above. 
138. See, for example, North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 34 (“That there shall be no establishment of any 
one religious church or denomination in this State, in preference to any other. . . .”); Peter Wiernik, History of 
the Jews in America: From the Period of the Discovery of the New World to the Present Time (New York: Jewish Press 
Publishing Co., 1912), 118 (characterizing Article 32 as an “exception” to the “liberty of worship” provided 
for by the North Carolina Constitution of 1776); see generally Luke Beck, “The Constitutional Prohibition 
on Religious Tests,” Melbourne University Law Review 35 (2011): 323; Gerard V. Bradley, “The No Religious 
Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself,” Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 37 (1987): 674; Daniel L. Dreisbach, “The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: 
Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban,” Journal of Church and State 38 (1996): 261; Paul Horwitz, 
“Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial 
Nominations,” William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 15 (2006): 75; Bryan H. Wildenthal, “Nationalizing 
the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867–1873,” Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 18 (2009): 153.
139. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art. 31.
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the same fate.”140 This is “the peculiar state of affairs [by modern sensibilities] into 
which political life in North Carolina had drifted.”141 The records available indicate 
that the only people who were actually expelled from the North Carolina legislature, 
based on a religious test during the antebellum period, were three Protestant 
ministers. For this reason and others, it is possible that in 1776, the higher purpose 
of Articles 31 and 32 was not essentially exclusionary—although that was certainly 
their effect. Rather, the goal may have been simply to model the newly independent 
state of North Carolina’s Revolutionary-era constitution as closely as possible on the 
extant British constitution and its conventions,142 taking into account the loss of 
royal officers and different circumstances in the New World, including, for example, 
the movement toward religious disestablishment.143 This might explain why men like 
Gaston, although they opposed Article 32 to some degree, did not feel aggrieved or 
moved by it in any strong or deeply personal sense.144 To put it another way, political 
disqualification—based on a religious test—is wholly un-American, as American 
identity is now conceived. But the Constitution of North Carolina in 1776, with its 
House of Commons,145 and its two House members (elected countywide) for each 
county (or “shire”?) and its separate representation in the House for each town (or 
“borough”), and its exclusion of the clergy from the Commons, was modeled, in 
part, on an older English identity—even if, perhaps, it was only an English identity 
of the North Carolinian imagination.146 For example, many of the names of the 
140. Hurley, “The Political Status of Roman Catholics in North Carolina,” 271.
141. Ibid. 
142. Harry Simonhoff, Jewish Notables in America 1776–1865: Links of an Endless Chain (New York: Greenberg 
Publisher, 1956), 137. Jacob Henry hinted at this possibility in his speech in his own defense. “Jacob Henry 
in the North Carolina Legislature,” in Agar, The American Orator’s Own Book, 228 (“It is difficult to conceive 
how such a provision [as Article 32] crept into the [North Carolina] [C]onstitution, unless it was from the 
difficulty the human mind feels in suddenly emancipating itself from fetters by which it has long been 
enchained.”). 
143. See notes 1 and 113, above. See, for example, McDaniel v. Paty, United States Reports, 435 (Supreme 
Court of the United States 1978) 618, 622 (Burger, CJ, plurality opinion); Griffith J. McRee, ed., Life and 
Correspondence of James Iredell, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1857), 1:339. See also North Carolina 
Const. of 1776, art. 34. 
144. See note 80 (quoting Gaston and Hurley), above. Compare Brown, Self-Evident Truths, 43 (suggesting 
that “the fact that exclusion from public office was the only disability Catholics and Jews faced in North 
Carolina illustrates the breadth of the Revolutionary commitment to natural religious equality”), Powell, 
North Carolina through Four Centuries, 275 (“[M]any able North Carolinians of the time, though not actually 
guilty of religious bigotry, had no quarrel with the provision.”), and Simonhoff, Jewish Notables in Americas, 
137–138, with Henry G. Connor and Joseph B. Cheshire Jr., The Constitution of the State of North Carolina 
Annotated (Raleigh, N.C.: Edwards and Broughton Printing Co., 1911), xxvii (asserting that Article 32 was an 
“attempt to discriminate against Christians, other than Protestants”), and Ready, The Tar Heel State, 173 (“At 
the heart of the issue lay the ancient animosity between Protestants and Catholics.”).
145. Kabala, Church-State Relations in the Early American Republic, 109 (mistakenly identifying, and thereby 
modernizing and Americanizing, the name of the North Carolina “House of Commons,” as the North 
Carolina “House of Representatives”). 
146. Ready, The Tar Heel State, 170 (describing the town or “borough franchise” as “an ancient English 
custom kept by North Carolina’s revolutionary founders”); “Jacob Rees-Mogg teaches SNP a History Lesson,” 
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counties the participants in the Henry proceedings hailed from were connected 
with English and wider imperial transatlantic history: Anson, Carteret, Craven, 
Cumberland, Duplin, Halifax, Martin, Onslow, Pitt, and Rockingham Counties.147 
Still, in North Carolina, in 1776, and even as late as 1809, the transition had not yet 
been completed from the older English identity to the political mores that twenty-
first century Americans now take for granted. 
One concludes that what prior commentators have written about the Henry 
motion is largely a reflection of who they were (or are) and what they wanted to 
find because they found things absent straightforward documentary support. The 
writers of the secondary and tertiary literature who concluded that the motion to 
vacate Henry’s seat was rejected based on Henry’s speech or on the member/officer 
argument or on both—were right in part and wrong in part. These commentators 
were right in believing—even if they lacked good evidentiary support on which 
to base their beliefs—that both of those arguments were advanced in 1809. They 
were wrong in asserting that these were the only, much less the most significant, 
arguments advanced on the floor of the House of Commons on December 6, 1809. 
Likewise, the position of the authors of the tertiary literature—that it was one or both 
arguments that convinced the members to vote against the motion to vacate Henry’s 
seat—lacked substantial evidentiary support at the time they made that argument, as 
indicated by the newspaper reports from December 1809 and early 1810. However, 
it is conceivable that one or both arguments convinced the members to vote as they 
did. It is not surprising that the historical record is unclear on this point. What may 
be surprising is the clarity so many prior commentators thought they had found. 
It is possible, but not certain, that Henry’s supporters might have carried the 
day based on either or both of those arguments. In fact, though, Henry and his 
supporters were unwilling (if not, unable) to press the point on a preliminary 
vote prior to submitting the matter to the committee of the whole. Had Henry’s 
supporters lost that vote, the entire issue might have been resolved on the “deny” 
argument standing alone, and perhaps that argument also would not have carried 
majority support. Based on the historical records—even as augmented by the 
newspaper reports from December 1809 and early 1810—it is impossible to tell what 
reasons (if any) persuaded the members to vote as they did. 
It is certainly possible that the “deny” argument is what carried the day—or, more 
likely, put Henry’s majority over the top. Most members who voted to reject the 
motion likely acted for a variety of reasons and motives.148 That too is not surprising. 
YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOWqpF6cKEg (“House of Commons . . . started in 1265. . . . 
1265 is when the burgesses come from the towns.”) (at 2:50ff); see also note 37, above. 
147. Legislative Manual 1874, 157, 184, 204, 207, 218, 243, 277, 292, 298, 314, and 326 (explaining the 
origin of each county’s name).
148. Andrew Verstein, “The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives,” Yale Law Journal 127 (March 2018): 1106. 
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It is not difficult to imagine that many members liked Henry149 and Gaston, and that 
some—with a Jeffersonian outlook—disliked Article 32, and especially disliked being 
cast in the role of religious inquisitors, but felt duty bound to enforce that provision 
in some fashion broadly consistent with their legislative oaths. But an admitted, 
abstract duty to enforce an unpopular150 constitutional provision is not inconsistent 
with enforcing the provision only in cases where its violation is reasonably (if not 
convincingly) clear. And the “deny” argument gave a lawyer-like rule-of-law grounded 
riposte to any who might have accused the members of having failed to do their 
sworn duty. One might call this tactic parliamentary “strict constructionism.” If it is 
fair to expect politicians to act like politicians, it is reasonable to expect, like Henry’s 
contemporaries, that lawyers, judges, and others in elected assemblies act like lawyers, 
judges—and other sophisticated parliamentarians. 
The prior extant secondary and tertiary literature focuses almost entirely on 
Henry and Gaston (and occasionally on Judge Taylor). But as the newspapers report, 
there were other important actors. We might reconsider Hugh C. Mills, not for his 
memory’s sake, but for our own better understanding. There are many possibilities. 
Was he an officious bigot—a vexatious intermeddler? Or was he a fair-minded Cato-
like guardian of the constitution, burdened with an unrelenting and undesired 
duty to see that that constitution, as written, was enforced?151 Who is to say? If the 
149. Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:507–508 (“[H]e retained his seat despite his arguments. They liked the man; 
that was sufficient for them.”); Marcus, The Jew in the American World, 94; Jonathan D. Sarna and Benjamin 
Shapell, Lincoln and the Jews: A History (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015), 8; Hühner, The Struggle for 
Religious Liberty, 48. On the other hand, Henry occasionally found himself in court for disputes involving 
debts and contracts—including disputes about slaves. P. W. Fisher, One Dozen Pre-Revolutionary War Families of 
Eastern North Carolina and Some of their Descendants (New Bern, N.C.: Owen G. Dunn Co., 1958), 13. 
150. Harry L. Golden, “The Jewish People of North Carolina,” North Carolina Historical Review 32 (April 
1955): 194, 197 (affirming that there was “no pride in this [state] constitutional provision”). Alternatively, 
some might have been very attached to Article 32. Ready, The Tar Heel State, 174 (explaining that in 1835 
state convention debate on Article 32: “The religious test . . . stirred so much passion that delegates too ill 
to walk asked to be carried on litters to hear the debates.”); see also E. W. Caruthers, A Sketch of the Life and 
Character of the Rev. David Caldwell, D.D. (Greensborough, N.C.: Swaim and Sherwood, 1842), 190 (“[M]any 
still doubt the propriety of altering . . . [A]rticle [32], as was done in 1835.”). 
151. See The Honorable Edward H. Levi, “Bicentennial Address of the Attorney General at Touro Synagogue,” 
Rhode Island Jewish Historical Notes 7 (November 1976): 320, 322 (“In 1809 the North Carolina legislature 
unsuccessfully tried to exclude Jacob Henry, who, as a Jew, did not subscribe to the Divine authority of the 
New Testament as required by the state constitution.”). One notes Attorney General Levi’s hyperbole: it 
was not the legislature (as a whole) but only the Commons that was involved. The Commons did not “try” 
to exclude Henry, it was only Hugh C. Mills; and Mills—in the final vote—may not have supported his own 
motion. Finally, Levi’s framing the situation in terms of what Henry “subscribe[d] to” as opposed to what he 
“den[ied]” is also misplaced. North Carolina Const. of 1776, art 32. Such hyperbole can be found in much 
of the literature on the Jacob Henry incident. See, for example, Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North 
Carolina, 181 n. 6 (describing the incident as a “prolonged contest”); James Ingram Martin Sr., “Judaism,” 
in Religious Traditions of North Carolina, 132 n. 4; Jonathan D. Sarna and David G. Dalin, Religion and State in 
the American Jewish Experience (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 4; David Sorkin, 
Jewish Emancipation: A History across Five Centuries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019), 227. 
Indeed, some historians paint strikingly different pictures based on the same small constellation of known 
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newspaper reports of unanimous rejection of Mills’s resolution were correct, then he 
was part of that unanimous block of members (unless he had been absent when the 
proceedings ended or simply chose not to vote). If he voted against his own resolution, 
there is little reason to believe that he or any significant number of his colleagues 
were religious bigots seeking an auto-da-fé at the first opportunity.152 Also, why did 
Mills not challenge Henry’s qualifications when the members took their oaths on 
November 20, 1809? Why did he wait until December 5—after Henry had qualified? 
If you, the reader, have stubbornly persisted in going with the author thus far, I 
would ask you to go with me a bit farther still. But here, admittedly, I shift from law 
and history, to conjecture and hypothesis. Perhaps some future sibyl will fill in the 
intellectual gaps that I cannot. Is not the quality of the reported debate on the Henry 
motion—the sophistication, the complexity, and the sheer number of arguments 
marshaled on each side—all on one day’s notice—more than somewhat surprising? Is 
it just possible, may we not hope, that the debate was pre-planned and pre-arranged, 
that Henry was set up?153 Perhaps the motion and subsequent proceedings had been 
arranged to provide a public vehicle for debating Article 32 and to create a record 
toward its amendment or abolition? If a cabal of members were quietly engineering 
such strategic parliamentary politics for the consumption of their colleagues and the 
wider demos, for what reason should we be surprised? 
And if you or I were consigned, by a trick of fate, to similar circumstances, 
could we aspire to do any more than these members did in the winter of 1809? 
 
 
facts. Compare Marcus, United States Jewry, 1:507 (positing that “after consulting with eminent Christian 
jurists, Henry wrote a letter [i.e, his speech] to his colleagues in the House of Commons”), with Meacham, 
American Gospel, 108 (characterizing the Jacob Henry incident as “[a] standoff . . . with Christian lawmakers 
refusing to seat [Henry]”). 
152. Some might argue that Mills’s effort to enforce the law of the 1776 North Carolina state constitution, 
as he understood it, presumptively establishes that he was a bigot. Alternatively, the circumstantial evidence 
involving Mills’s delay in seeking to unseat Henry, and Mills’s not opposing the apparently unanimous vote 
against his motion to vacate Henry’s seat—both would seem to indicate that reasons and motives beyond 
mere bigotry were at work. Harry L. Golden, Jewish Roots in the Carolinas: A Pattern of American Philo-Semitism 
(Greensboro, N.C.: Deal Printing Co., 1955), 12 (noting “that during the entire ninety-year debate for the 
repeal of [Article 32], I have been unable to uncover a single derogatory reference to the Jews, as a people”). 
Of course, not all have agreed (and will agree) with this. See Andrews, review of Ante-Bellum North Carolina: 
A Social History, 171 (“One notices furthermore a trace of anti-Semitism in the attempt to exclude a Jew 
named Jacob Henry from a seat in the House of Commons in 1809.”); see also Hühner, The Struggle for 
Religious Liberty, 46 (asserting that Mills was “actuated by some spiteful motive”). 
153. To be sure, at the start of his speech in his own defense, Henry made clear that he had no advance 
knowledge of Mills’s motion. On the other hand, a fair number of newspaper editors might not have 
believed Henry—some newspapers introduced Henry’s speech with the following language: “The speech is 
alledged to be from the impulse of the moment.” Northern Whig (Hudson, N.Y.), March 8, 1810 (quoting 
“the Philadelphia Register,” and ascribing the speech to “Henry Jacobs”). Other newspapers also used this 
“alleged” language.
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